Disputed easementary rights and pathway claims require civil adjudication, not writ determination.

The petitioner claimed that an approximately 8-foot-wide pathway through Survey Nos. 1143 and 1155 had been used for decades to access his home and agricultural land, and also served a local temple and ghat.

He alleged that respondent No. 5 sought to fence or obstruct the route.

A revenue inspection recorded the existence of a pathway but noted uncertainty concerning identification and possession of parts of the land.

The petitioner had filed Civil/Misc. No. 161/2024 before the Munsiff, Shangus; the Civil Court ordered status quo on 9 July 2024, then vacated the interim protection on 17 July 2026.

The petitioner challenged Notification S.O. 144 of 2022 and sought, among other reliefs, demarcation and protection of the pathway.

A Division Bench had already rejected the challenge to the notification and referred the remaining issues to the Single Judge.

Whether the petitioner’s claimed easementary right, and the disputed pathway’s location, use and alleged obstruction, could be determined in writ proceedings or required adjudication on evidence before the Civil Court.

Whether the High Court should interfere under Article 227 with the Civil Court’s order vacating interim protection, or restore the status quo order.

Whether the challenge to Notification S.O. 144 of 2022 remained open for consideration in the writ petition.

Section 2(b) of the J&K Migrant Immovable Property (Preservation, Protection and Restraint on Distress Sales) Act, 1997 defines the “Competent Authority” to include an officer appointed by the Government for an area; the Division Bench had relied on that provision to uphold Notification S.O. 144 of 2022.

Disputed questions requiring detailed evidence—such as the location of a pathway, the nature and duration of its use, and whether an easement arose by prescription or necessity—are appropriately determined in civil proceedings rather than on the limited record in writ proceedings.

Under Article 227, supervisory jurisdiction is not appellate jurisdiction and is exercised sparingly to keep subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority, not to correct ordinary errors or substitute the High Court’s view for an interlocutory assessment [para. 32; Mohd. Inam v. Sanjay Kumar Singhal, (2020) 7 SCC 327].

The Court also applied the principle that what cannot be done directly cannot be achieved indirectly to prevent the writ petition from circumventing the pending civil proceedings [paras. 26–29; NOIDA Entrepreneurs Association v. NOIDA, (2011) 6 SCC 508; State of Tamil Nadu v. K. Shyam Sunder, (2011) AIR SC 3470].

The challenge to S.O. 144 of 2022 was no longer for determination because the Division Bench had already upheld the notification under Section 2(b) of the 1997 Act.

The remaining dispute depended on contested facts, including the pathway’s precise location, the character and duration of its use, the parties’ possession, and whether any easement existed; the Court therefore considered the pending civil proceedings the appropriate forum for adjudication on evidence.

The petitioner could not use writ jurisdiction to obtain relief overlapping with the interim protection declined by the Civil Court.

The order dated 17 July 2026 disclosed no jurisdictional error, perversity or manifest failure of justice warranting Article 227 intervention, and restoring status quo would effectively substitute the High Court’s view for the Civil Court’s interlocutory assessment.

The petitioner remained at liberty to pursue the pending civil proceedings or other proceedings before the competent Civil Court and raise all claims concerning the pathway, easement, possession and obstruction.

The Court expressed no opinion on the merits, leaving all questions of fact and law open for the Civil Court.