Disputed victim age is a factual issue requiring determination at trial, not discharge.

The petitioner sought quashing of the order dated 29 January 2019 by which the District and Sessions Judge, Supaul rejected his discharge application in Sessions Trial No. 239 of 2018 arising from Supaul P.S. Case No. 372 of 2018 under Section 366A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

The informant alleged that his approximately 16-year-old daughter, Damyanti Devi, was abducted by the petitioner and other co-accused in a white vehicle on 14 May 2018; the petitioner had allegedly been tutoring her.

Although the police submitted a final form/closure report, the jurisdictional Magistrate took cognizance against the petitioner under Sections 336A/34 IPC.

The petitioner relied on the victim’s statement under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), in which she stated that she was 18 years old and in a relationship with him, as well as a Medical Board assessment placing her age between 18 and 19 years.

Whether the High Court should interfere with the rejection of the petitioner’s discharge application where the victim’s age, majority, and the applicability of a margin of error were disputed factual questions?

Whether the materials relied upon by the petitioner conclusively established that the victim was major on the date of occurrence so as to negate the offence alleged under Section 366A IPC at the discharge stage?

The Court considered the offence alleged under Section 366A IPC and the discharge jurisdiction under Section 227 CrPC. At the stage of framing charge or considering discharge, the court may proceed where the materials disclose a prima facie case or give rise to grave suspicion; it is not required to conduct a detailed appreciation of evidence at that stage.

This principle was supported by Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368, and State of Tamil Nadu v. R. Soundirarasu, (2023) 6 SCC 768.

The petitioner relied on Rajak Mohammad v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2018) 9 SCC 248, concerning the permissible marginal error in age assessment; however, the Court treated the applicability of that principle as dependent on disputed factual findings regarding the victim’s actual age.

The Court held that the prosecution case described the victim as approximately 16 years old at the time of the alleged occurrence, while the petitioner relied on her Section 164 CrPC statement and the Medical Board’s assessment of her age as 18–19 years.

Since no unimpeachable document, such as a matriculation certificate, had been produced or collected to conclusively establish her age, the question whether she was legally major—and whether any marginal-error principle could be applied—could not be determined conclusively at the discharge stage.

The Court therefore considered the petitioner’s challenge to involve disputed questions of fact whose veracity could properly be tested during trial, rather than in proceedings under Section 227 CrPC.

It found no legal or procedural error warranting interference with the order rejecting discharge. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit, and the judgment was directed to be communicated to the trial court along with the trial court record, if any.