Disputes over co-ownership shares and metes-and-bounds demarcation require recourse to the Civil Court.

The appellant challenged the order of the learned Single Judge dismissing his writ petition against the decision of the Special Secretary, Revenue Department (“SSRD”), which had rejected Revision Application No. 52 of 2024 by order dated 31 July 2025.

The dispute concerned conversion of land bearing Revenue Survey No. 324/1 into non-agricultural (“NA”) land in 2016 on an application made by respondent No. 1, who was admittedly a co-owner.

The appellant contended that NA permission could not be granted without partition or demarcation of the co-owners’ shares by metes and bounds, and without notice to or consent of the appellant.

Respondent No. 1 relied on a registered sale deed dated 18 September 2010 executed by the appellant, as well as eight other registered sale deeds executed by the remaining family members/co-owners, claiming absolute ownership over the land.

The appellant had not challenged the sale deed and had not instituted any civil suit seeking demarcation or partition of the co-owners’ shares.

The High Court also noted that the appellant had failed to disclose the sale deed in the writ proceedings.

Whether the Collector could grant NA permission in respect of jointly held land on the application of one co-owner without prior partition or demarcation by metes and bounds, and without the consent or intimation of the other co-owner?

Whether the appellant’s challenge to the NA conversion and the SSRD’s order could be entertained in writ jurisdiction when the underlying dispute concerned title, ownership, and demarcation of shares, for which no civil suit had been filed?

Whether the appellant’s failure to disclose the registered sale deed in favour of respondent No. 1 disentitled him to relief under writ jurisdiction?

The Court applied the principle that disputes concerning title, ownership, partition, and demarcation of co-owners’ shares by metes and bounds are matters for determination by a competent Civil Court and cannot ordinarily be resolved in writ proceedings.

It further proceeded on the principle that a registered sale deed remains operative unless legally challenged and set aside; accordingly, the appellant’s execution of the registered sale deed dated 18 September 2010 was relevant to respondent No. 1’s asserted title.

The Court also applied the equitable principle that a litigant seeking relief under writ jurisdiction must approach the Court with clean hands and make full and candid disclosure of material facts.

No specific statutory provision or judicial precedent was cited in the judgment.

The Court found no error in the Single Judge’s dismissal of the writ petition or in the SSRD’s rejection of the revision.

The appellant’s objection that NA permission could not be granted without demarcation did not justify interference because the question of defining the parties’ respective shares was essentially a civil dispute, and the appropriate remedy was to institute a civil suit for partition or demarcation.

The appellant had neither challenged the registered sale deed executed in favour of respondent No. 1 nor filed such a civil suit.

Further, respondent No. 1 relied on nine registered sale deeds, including the deed executed by the appellant, to assert that he had acquired the entire interest in the land.

The appellant’s non-disclosure of the sale deed in the writ petition was treated as a material suppression of fact and as conduct inconsistent with the requirement of approaching the Court with clean hands.

It declined to adjudicate the appellant’s claim regarding partition or demarcation of shares in writ jurisdiction, leaving such issues to be pursued before the competent Civil Court.

The Letters Patent Appeal was dismissed without an order as to costs, and the connected Civil Application for stay was disposed of as having become infructuous.