DNA test cannot be ordered to determine legitimacy absent evidence proving impossibility of access under Section 112.

The petitioners challenged a trial court order dated 14.02.2025, which rejected their application under Section 151 of the CPC for a DNA test of Defendant No. 1

The petitioners alleged that Defendant No. 1 could not be the biological son of the deceased, Sajan Singh, because he was born on 06.07.1995—nearly 12 months after Sajan Singh and Defendant No. 2 (the mother) purportedly ceased cohabitation upon executing a Farkatinama (relinquishment deed) on 12.07.1994

The respondents argued the application was inconsistent with the plaint and contrary to settled law regarding the presumption of legitimacy

The Court primarily applied Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which mandates that birth during a valid marriage is "conclusive proof" of legitimacy unless it is shown that the parties had "no access" to each other at the time of conception

The Court followed the principles in Ivan Rathinam v. Milan Joseph (2025), establishing that "non-access" implies the impossibility, not just the inability, of marital relations

It further relied on Dipanwita Roy v. Ronobroto Roy (2015) and Aparna Ajinkya Firodia (2024), which clarify that DNA tests should be avoided to protect a child's legitimacy unless there is an "eminent need" and the issue of legitimacy is merely incidental to a primary claim like adultery

Finally, it noted that under Hindu Law, divorce cannot be effected solely via a private deed

The Court held that the Farkatinama was inadmissible in evidence because it was neither stamped nor registered as required by law

The Court observed that since there was no valid divorce decree, the marriage between Sajan Singh and Defendant No. 2 was legally subsisting at the time of Defendant No. 1’s birth

Under Section 112, this creates a rigorous presumption of legitimacy that can only be displaced by proving the impossibility of access within the 280-day gestational window

The Court distinguished this case from precedents where DNA tests were allowed, noting that the petitioners’ primary goal was to challenge the child's legitimacy rather than prove a separate ground like adultery

It concluded that a DNA test cannot be used as a shortcut to bypass the requirement of proving non-access through regular evidence

The High Court dismissed the petition, finding no jurisdictional error in the trial court's refusal to order a DNA test. The petitioners were granted the liberty to attempt to rebut the presumption under Section 112 of the Evidence Act by leading appropriate evidence regarding non-access during the trial