Double presumption of innocence does not bar leave where acquittal raises arguable issues requiring appellate scrutiny.

SEBI filed a petition under Section 419(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), seeking leave to appeal against the judgment dated 13.05.2025 passed by the ASJ-03, Special Judge (Companies Act), Dwarka Courts, New Delhi, in Registration No. CC/734/2023, whereby the respondent/accused no. 2 was acquitted of the offences charged against him.

The respondent opposed the petition, contending that the acquittal attracted a double presumption of innocence and that leave could not be granted merely on a prima facie assessment.

He also argued that the petition was filed beyond the six-month limitation period under Section 419(5) BNSS.

SEBI contended that the time taken to obtain the certified copy of the judgment was liable to be excluded and that, after such exclusion, the petition was filed within limitation.

The certified copy was applied for on 30.10.2025, prepared and delivered on 23/24.12.2025, and the petition was filed on 30.12.2025.

Whether leave to appeal against the respondent’s acquittal should be refused at the threshold because of the enhanced or “double” presumption of innocence, or whether the existence of arguable points and the need for deeper scrutiny required leave to be granted.

Whether the petition under Section 419(3) BNSS was barred by the six-month limitation period under Section 419(5) BNSS, after accounting for the time spent in obtaining the certified copy of the impugned judgment.

The Court applied Sections 419(3) and 419(5) of the BNSS, governing leave to appeal against acquittal and the applicable six-month limitation period, respectively.

Relying on Manoj Rameshlal Chhabriya v. Mahesh Prakash Ahuja, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 451, and State of Maharashtra v. Sujay Mangesh Poyarekar, (2008) 9 SCC 475, the Court held that, at the leave stage, the appellate court must determine whether a prima facie case or arguable points exist; it should not conduct a minute or final reappraisal of the evidence, but must grant leave where the record calls for deeper scrutiny or reconsideration.

The Court also referred to Sita Ram v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1979) 2 SCC 656, emphasizing that appellate review is founded on the principle of human fallibility and the need for a further examination of facts and law.

For limitation, the Court applied the principle that the period consumed in obtaining the certified copy of the impugned judgment may be excluded from computation.

The Court rejected the respondent’s submission that the double presumption of innocence, by itself, justified refusal of leave.

It held that whether the evidence required deeper scrutiny, reappreciation, or reconsideration was a matter to be assessed in the appeal on merits, and not conclusively determined at the leave stage.

Since the Court was not required to decide whether the acquittal would ultimately be set aside, the leave petition could not be rejected merely on the basis of the presumption favouring an acquitted accused.

On limitation, the period between the application for the certified copy and its preparation and delivery—calculated by the Court as 54 days—was excluded.

Although 232 days had elapsed from the date of judgment to the filing of the petition, the effective period was 178 days, which was within the statutory limit of 180 days under Section 419(5) BNSS.

It granted SEBI leave to appeal against the acquittal, directed the Registry to register the matter as a criminal appeal, ordered the appeal to be admitted, and issued notice to the respondent returnable on 20.11.2026.