Electricity disconnection alone cannot negate corroborated evidence of employment and a workplace accident.

The appellant claimed that he had been employed by the respondent since 18.06.1990.

On 15.06.1997, while working on a cardboard-cutting machine at the respondent’s factory, his right hand came into contact with the machine, resulting in amputation of four fingers and part of his thumb.

He claimed that the machine was defective and that he was attempting to remove a stuck pin when the accident occurred.

His disability was assessed at 50%; he claimed monthly wages of Rs.1,580 and compensation of Rs.1,16,251.

The respondent denied the employer–employee relationship and contended that the factory’s electricity connection had been disconnected on 26.05.1997, making operation of the machine on the date of the alleged accident impossible.

The Commissioner under the Workmen’s Compensation Act dismissed the claim, primarily relying on the electricity-disconnection report and finding that the employment relationship and occurrence of the accident during employment were not proved.

The appellant challenged that order under Section 30 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923.

1. Whether the Commissioner was justified in dismissing the claim by treating the electricity-disconnection report as determinative, while allegedly ignoring the appellant’s and co-workers’ ocular evidence and the respondent’s admission regarding taking the injured appellant to hospital.

2. Whether the appellant established that he was an employee of the respondent and that the injury arose out of and in the course of his employment.

3. Whether the appellant was entitled to compensation, and if so, in what amount and with what interest under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923.

An appeal under Section 30 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 lies only on a substantial question of law and is not equivalent to a regular first appeal; however, interference is permissible where the Commissioner ignores material evidence, adopts an erroneous legal approach, or records a perverse finding.

Compensation is payable where an employee suffers personal injury by an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. “In the course of employment” concerns the time and circumstances of employment, while “arising out of employment” requires a causal connection between the employment and the injury.

Section 4-A governs the payment of interest on delayed compensation.

The Court also applied the relevant factors under Schedule IV and the prescribed loss-of-earning-capacity provisions in Part II of Schedule I to the Act for computing compensation.

No specific precedent was identified by name in the judgment; the Court relied on the general principle that a perversely arrived finding of fact may raise a substantial question of law.

The Court held that the Commissioner had wrongly treated the electricity-disconnection report as conclusive.

The report established only that electricity was disconnected on 26.05.1997; its maker had no personal knowledge of the factory’s functioning thereafter, and the report could not override the direct testimony of the appellant and co-workers.

AW-2 stated that he was working with the appellant and had pulled the appellant’s hand out of the machine, while AW-5 supported the occurrence at the factory.

The discrepancies concerning the respondent’s presence and the hospitals to which the appellant was taken related to peripheral details and did not destroy the core version of the accident.

The respondent’s admission that he found the appellant injured near the factory and took him towards Dhami Nursing Home, together with his admission that workers operated the machine, materially corroborated the appellant’s case.

The respondent also failed to produce attendance or wage records to disprove the employment relationship.

Considering the evidence cumulatively and applying the preponderance-of-probabilities standard, the Court found that the appellant was engaged in the respondent’s factory and suffered the injury during employment.

For quantum, the Court applied the factor of 215.28 for a 26-year-old workman and calculated compensation on the basis of 60% of monthly wages and 50% loss of earning capacity, resulting in Rs.1,02,043.

The appeal was allowed and the Commissioner’s order dated 23.10.2000 was set aside.

The respondent was directed to pay Rs.1,02,043 to the appellant, together with interest at 12% per annum from 15.06.1997, the date of the accident, until realization.

The respondent was directed to deposit the compensation and accrued interest before the Commissioner within two months of receiving a certified copy of the judgment, after which the amount was to be disbursed to the appellant in accordance with law.