Electricity distributors bear strict liability for electrocution caused by fallen live wires, irrespective of negligence.

Mangilal died by electrocution on 25 November 2009 at approximately 8:00 a.m. in an agricultural field near his residence after a live wire fell from an 11 KV electric pole.

His parents, Dulari and another respondent, instituted a civil suit claiming ₹32,00,000 as compensation, alleging negligence by the appellant electricity company in maintaining and supervising the electric line.

The electricity company denied the occurrence as pleaded and asserted that the incident had taken place inside Mangilal’s house while he was repairing an electricity line, and that the deceased himself was negligent.

The District Judge, Sheopur partly decreed the suit and awarded ₹4,80,000 with interest at 6% per annum from the date of filing of the suit until realization.

The electricity company challenged the decree under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Whether the electricity company was liable to compensate the plaintiffs for Mangilal’s death by electrocution, notwithstanding the absence of proof of negligence on its part?

Whether the plaintiffs proved that the accident occurred in the agricultural field due to the falling of a live wire from the company’s 11 KV electric pole, rather than inside the deceased’s house while he was repairing an electrical line?

Whether the trial court’s findings and award were perverse or otherwise liable to interference in an appeal under Section 96 CPC?

The Court applied Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, under which an appellate court may interfere with the trial court’s findings where they are erroneous, perverse, or unsupported by the evidence.

It applied the doctrine of strict liability to electricity providers, relying principally on M.P. Electricity Board v. Shail Kumari, (2002) 2 SCC 162, which holds that an undertaking involving hazardous or risky exposure to human life is liable to compensate for resulting injury irrespective of negligence or the precautions taken.

The Court also relied on the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, that a person who brings and keeps on land something likely to cause harm if it escapes is prima facie liable for the natural consequences of its escape.

It further noted the principle of absolute liability for hazardous or inherently dangerous activities stated in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1987) 1 SCC 395, and held that the electricity company could not avoid liability merely by alleging negligence or fault on the part of the deceased.

The Court held that electricity distribution is a hazardous activity attracting strict liability.

Consequently, the plaintiffs were not required to establish negligence by the electricity company once the death was shown to have resulted from the escape or falling of a live electric wire.

The plaintiffs’ version was supported by the testimony of Siyaram (PW-1) and Badrilal (PW-2), the FIR lodged on the same day without delay, the police panchnama, and the post-mortem report establishing death by electrocution.

In contrast, the company’s Junior Engineer merely stated that he had visited the site and conducted an enquiry, but the line staff who allegedly accompanied him was not examined, the alleged enquiry report was not produced, and no maintenance records were filed.

The trial court was therefore justified in drawing an adverse inference against the company.

The company’s assertion that the deceased was repairing an electrical line inside the house remained an unsupported denial and did not displace the plaintiffs’ corroborated evidence.

Since the trial court’s view was a possible and evidence-based view, the appellate court found no ground for interference under Section 96 CPC.

It held that the company was strictly liable for Mangilal’s death caused by the falling live wire and that the plaintiffs had sufficiently proved the occurrence as pleaded.

The judgment and decree awarding ₹4,80,000 with interest at 6% per annum from the date of filing of the suit until payment were affirmed.

The first appeal was dismissed.