Engineer Said ₹10,000 He Took Was Tender Money; Orissa HC Refuses State Leave To Appeal His Bribery Acquittal

The respondent, an Assistant Engineer, was accused of demanding ₹20,000, later reduced to ₹10,000, from a contractor for processing and passing bills.

A vigilance trap was conducted, and the tainted currency was recovered from the respondent; hand-wash tests were positive.

The trial court acquitted him under Section 248(1) CrPC, finding that the prosecution had not proved the money was illegal gratification and that the defence explanation—that it related to tender dues—was reasonably probable in light of the parties’ admitted enmity and other circumstances.

The State sought leave to appeal against the acquittal under Section 378 CrPC.

Section 378(1) and (3) CrPC governs an appeal against acquittal and the grant of leave; Section 248(1) CrPC provides for acquittal after trial.

The charges arose under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d), read with Section 13(2), of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

Applying Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa v. State of Karnataka, 2026 INSC 67, the Court stated that an acquittal should not be disturbed where the trial court’s view is reasonably possible; interference is justified where the judgment is perverse, rests on misreading or omission of material evidence, or is clearly unreasonable.

Relying also on Mallappa v. State of Karnataka, 2024 INSC 104, the Court held that acquittal strengthens the presumption of innocence and requires a higher threshold for appellate interference.

The Court considered the State’s arguments that the trial court had undervalued the trap evidence and improperly accepted the respondent’s explanation concerning tender dues.

It nevertheless found the trial court’s assessment neither perverse nor wholly unreasonable: the trial court had considered the admitted enmity, the evidence concerning tender papers, the respondent’s explanation, related civil litigation, and suspicious circumstances surrounding the alleged bills.

Because that assessment was a possible view on the evidence, the recovery and chemical-test evidence did not establish a basis to displace the acquittal under the heightened standard governing such appeals.

The State’s leave petition, CRLLP No. 2 of 2012, was dismissed.