Revenue Inspector Accused Of Seeking ₹700 Bribe From Widow: Orissa HC Declines Leave To Appeal His Acquittal

In brief

The question

1. Whether the trial court’s acquittal was perverse, unreasonable, or based on a misreading or omission of material evidence, so as to justify appellate interference.

The court held

The High Court held that there was no legal or factual basis to unsettle the acquittal and declined to grant leave to appeal.

It also directed

The criminal leave petition was dismissed.

01Facts

Radhika Pradhan alleged that the respondent, a Revenue Inspector, demanded ₹1,000 to submit reports relating to certificates she had sought, and that after she paid ₹300 he demanded the balance ₹700.

pp. 2–4

A Vigilance trap was laid, and the prosecution alleged that the tainted currency was recovered from the respondent.

pp. 2–4

The respondent was charged under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

pp. 4–6

The Special Judge acquitted him, finding that acceptance of the bribe had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and considering his explanation that the money had been thrust upon him to be probable.

pp. 4–6

The State sought leave to appeal against the acquittal under Section 378(1) and (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

p. 1

02Issues

i.1. Whether the trial court’s acquittal was perverse, unreasonable, or based on a misreading or omission of material evidence, so as to justify appellate interference.

pp. 7–12

ii.2. Whether the State should be granted leave to appeal against the acquittal under Section 378(1) and (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

p. 1, 12

03Law Applied

Under Section 378(1) and (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, an appeal against acquittal requires leave. The appellate court must respect the reinforced presumption of innocence following acquittal and should not interfere merely because another view of the evidence is possible; interference is warranted where the acquittal is perverse, rests on misreading or omission of material evidence, or is clearly unreasonable.

pp. 7–11

The Court relied on Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa & Anr. v. State of Karnataka & Ors., 2026 INSC 67, and Mallappa & Ors. v. State of Karnataka, 2024 INSC 104, for these principles.

pp. 7–11

The charge in the trial arose under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

p. 1, 4

Provisions in the judgment · 3 · Linked ones open on LawLens

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 Section 378 Section 248

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 Section 13

04Reasoning

The State argued that the complainant’s evidence of demand and acceptance was corroborated by the trap-laying officer and other witnesses, and that the trial court had wrongly discounted the evidence and the handling of a hostile witness’s prior statement.

pp. 6–7

Applying the restrictive standard for appeals against acquittal, the High Court concluded that the trial court’s assessment was neither perverse nor wholly unreasonable. Because the trial court’s view was a possible one on the evidence, the prospect that another view could be taken did not justify appellate intervention.

pp. 11–12