Equality cannot be invoked to claim parity with benefits granted through administrative error.

The applicants were appointed as Teachers in the School Education Department on 14.09.1984 and promoted as Masters on 11.08.2003. Respondent No. 4, Harbans Lal, was promoted as Master subsequently on 23.08.2003 and was therefore junior to the applicants in the feeder cadre.

The applicants and respondent No. 4 were later placed as In-charge Lecturers in Mathematics on 18.07.2008, and their services were regularized under Government Order No. 236-Edu of 2013 dated 07.03.2013.

Respondent No. 4, however, received notional promotion/regularization as Lecturer with effect from 08.07.2005 and regular promotion from 18.07.2008, whereas the applicants were regularized only from 18.07.2008.

The respondents admitted that respondent No. 4’s seniority had incorrectly been recorded at No. 93, based on an erroneous date of promotion as Master, 23.08.2002 instead of 23.08.2003; his correct seniority was No. 143, below the applicants.

Their representation was rejected by Government Order No. 126-JK (Edu) of 2023 dated 16.05.2023, which they challenged before the Tribunal.

Whether the applicants were entitled to notional promotion/regularization as Lecturers in Mathematics with effect from 08.07.2005 merely because the junior respondent No. 4 had received that benefit?

Whether Government Order No. 126-JK (Edu) of 2023 dated 16.05.2023, rejecting the applicants’ representation, was liable to be quashed?

Whether the judgment in Subash Chander v. State of J&K required the respondents to extend the same retrospective promotional benefit to the applicants?

The Tribunal exercised jurisdiction under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.

It applied Article 14 of the Constitution, holding that equality before law does not require the extension or repetition of an illegal or erroneous benefit; “negative equality” is not enforceable.

A claim for retrospective promotion must be founded on an independent legal entitlement arising from the applicable service rules, seniority position, eligibility requirements and availability of promotional vacancies, and cannot rest solely on an erroneous benefit granted to another employee.

The Tribunal further applied the principle that an administrative mistake cannot become a precedent compelling the administration to commit successive mistakes.

A precedent is applicable only where the material facts and legal foundation are comparable; the decision in Subash Chander did not create an automatic right to retrospective promotion in the absence of an independently established entitlement.

The applicants were admittedly senior to respondent No. 4 in the cadre of Masters, but the Tribunal found that respondent No. 4’s notional promotion from 08.07.2005 resulted from his erroneous placement at Seniority No. 93, instead of his correct position at No. 143.

Accordingly, the benefit received by respondent No. 4 was not treated as a lawful consequence of his actual seniority or eligibility. Applying Article 14, the Tribunal held that the applicants could not convert that administrative error into an enforceable right to identical treatment.

The applicants failed to establish any independent statutory or service-rule entitlement to promotion from 08.07.2005, including the requisite eligibility and promotional vacancy conditions.

The reliance on Subash Chander was also rejected because the applicants had not demonstrated comparable facts or an independent legal basis requiring retrospective promotion.

The Department’s subsequent issuance of notices to respondent No. 4 further demonstrated that it treated his benefit as erroneous rather than as a valid precedent.

Government Order No. 126-JK (Edu) of 2023 dated 16.05.2023 was found legally sustainable and was not quashed.

The Original Application was dismissed, with no order as to costs; pending miscellaneous applications, if any, were also disposed of.

The Tribunal clarified that the Department could proceed against respondent No. 4 in accordance with law and natural justice, and that the judgment did not disturb any pensionary benefits otherwise lawfully payable to the applicants.