Equitable relief of injunction may be refused for gross delay and failure to identify specific suit property.

The petitioners (plaintiffs) claimed their deceased father entered into a notarized unregistered Agreement to Sell (ATS) with the respondent (defendant) on 09/05/2005 for suit properties and was put in possession.

Following the father's death in 2023, disputes arose, and the plaintiffs filed a suit for specific performance on 18/01/2024—approximately 19 years after the ATS.

The Trial Court granted an interim injunction against alienation.

The Appellate Court set aside this injunction on 08/06/2026, finding that the ATS lacked identification of the specific portion of land sold and noting the defendant was only one of three co-owners.

The plaintiffs challenged this reversal under Article 227 of the Constitution.

1. Whether the Appellate Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Order 43 Rule 1(r) of the CPC by substituting the Trial Court’s discretionary view with its own.

2. Whether an interlocutory injunction for specific performance can be granted when there is an identification deficit in the suit property and a significant delay (19 years) in filing the suit.

The Court applied the principles of Order 39 and Order 43 Rule 1(r) of the CPC regarding discretionary injunctions and appellate interference.

It relied on Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish Ambalal Choksi regarding the "perversity" threshold for upsetting Trial Court orders.

In matters of equity, it applied the doctrine of laches and delay as established in Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprise Ltd. v. KS Infraspace LLP Ltd.

Veetrang Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Gujarat State Textile Corp. Ltd.

It further considered Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, regarding the principle of lis pendens.

The High Court found that while appellate courts should not ordinarily interfere with discretionary orders, the Trial Court failed to appreciate critical legal hurdles.

Specifically, the ATS failed to identify the "four corners" or specific boundaries of the property, which is sine qua non for a prima facie case in specific performance involving co-owned land.

Furthermore, the 19-year delay between the ATS (2005) and the suit (2024) constituted "laches and undue delay," which disentitles a party to equitable relief regardless of whether the suit is within the statutory limitation period.

The court reasoned that since the father never sought performance during his lifetime and the property share was undemarcated, the Trial Court’s grant of injunction was not based on sound legal principles.

The High Court dismissed the petition, upholding the Appellate Court's order to vacate the injunction.

It noted that the plaintiffs' interests are sufficiently protected by the principle of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act.