Eviction under Senior Citizens Act requires proof of ill-treatment when parents possess alternative accommodation.

The Appellants, senior citizens (aged 75 and 70), are the owners of a property in Pamposh Enclave, New Delhi.

They alleged that their son and daughter-in-law (Respondents 2 and 3) subjected them to mental and physical abuse, forcibly ousted them from the property on January 23, 2024, and stole jewellery and property documents.

The Appellants filed an application for eviction under the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (“the Act”).

The District Magistrate dismissed the application on April 15, 2024, noting a lack of evidence of harassment and a protection order in favor of the daughter-in-law.

The Appellate Authority upheld this dismissal on January 10, 2025.

A Single Judge of the Delhi High Court subsequently dismissed the Appellants' Writ Petition challenging these orders on January 12, 2026.

This Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) assesses the validity of the Single Judge’s order.

Whether the findings of the District Magistrate and Divisional Commissioner regarding the lack of ill-treatment and harassment were perverse or required interference under writ jurisdiction.

Whether the Appellants were entitled to the eviction of their son and daughter-in-law solely on the basis of ownership under the Act, despite conflicting factual findings.

The court primarily applied the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, and the Delhi Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Rules, 2009.

It referenced precedents such as *Smt. Darshna v. GNCTD* and *Sandeep Gulati v. Divisional Commissioner*, which establish that senior citizens may seek eviction of heirs even from self-acquired property to ensure peace and tranquility.

It also applied the constitutional principle regarding the limited scope of judicial review under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, 1950, which restricts high courts from reassessing disputed questions of fact determined by specialized authorities unless those findings are perverse or arbitrary.

The Court observed that while the Act provides a mechanism for the protection of senior citizens, the fact-finding authorities (District Magistrate and Divisional Commissioner) had conducted an inquiry and found no evidence of harassment or ill-treatment.

The Divisional Commissioner noted through video evidence that the Appellant was short-tempered and that the Respondents were willing to care for the Appellants.

Furthermore, the existence of a prior protection order in favor of the daughter-in-law (Respondent 3) from the CMM, Saket, complicated the claim for summary eviction.

The Court reasoned that since the statutory authorities provided a thorough review of the evidence and reached a reasoned conclusion that the eviction was not justified on the merits of the specific conduct alleged, the High Court could not sit as a court of appeal to re-evaluate those facts.

It held that the orders passed by the statutory authorities under the Act were adequately reasoned and held no jurisdictional error, perversity, or arbitrariness.

The Court affirmed that it will not revisit disputed questions of fact in writ jurisdiction when specialized authorities have already evaluated the evidence and conducted a proper inquiry.