Exceptional circumstances justify time-bound directions for expeditious disposal of pending suits.

The petitioner-plaintiff brought Civil Suit No. 596 of 2006 seeking, among other reliefs, a declaration that a sale deed was void, correction of the Record of Rights and permanent injunction.

After P.W.1’s cross-examination concluded, P.W.2’s evidence affidavit was accepted, but his cross-examination proceeded over multiple hearing dates and remained incomplete; the petitioner attributed the repeated adjournments to the defendants.

Invoking Article 227, the petitioner sought the High Court’s intervention to expedite the suit and complete P.W.2’s cross-examination.

Whether the circumstances justified an Article 227 direction for expeditious disposal of the suit, notwithstanding the general restraint against fixing time-bound schedules for cases pending before other courts.

Whether the trial court should be requested to complete P.W.2’s cross-examination within a specified period.

Under Article 227, the High Court should ordinarily refrain from imposing time-bound schedules for disposal of cases pending before other courts. As stated in High Court Bar Association, Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., (2024) 6 SCC 267, and quoted in Sangram Sadashiv Suryavanshi v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 INSC 899, such directions may be issued only in exceptional circumstances; prioritisation should ordinarily be left to the court where the case is pending.

The trial court is expected to regulate its own procedure and ensure disposal within a reasonable period.

The High Court considered the suit’s pendency since 2006, the repeated adjournments during P.W.2’s cross-examination, and the parties’ circumstances as shown by the record.

It held that these amounted to special circumstances warranting intervention in the interest of justice, while recognising that a time-bound direction would not be appropriate as a routine measure.

The trial court was also requested to endeavour to complete P.W.2’s cross-examination within four weeks.

As notice had not been issued to the opposite parties, they were permitted to seek modification or recall if material facts had been suppressed.