Factories Act prosecutions filed beyond three months of the Inspector’s knowledge are barred by limitation.

The applicant, alleged to be the occupier of Ruby Macons Ltd.’s factory at Vapi, was prosecuted under Section 7A(2)(b) of the Factories Act, 1948, in Criminal Case No. 861 of 2014 filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Valsad.

The prosecution alleged that, on 11 September 2013, two heavy bundles of waste paper fell on and fatally crushed a worker who was performing housekeeping duties in the waste-paper godown, allegedly because the bundles had not been stored safely.

Factory officials inspected the site on 12 September, 20 September and 28 October 2013; statements of two persons were recorded on 3 December 2013, and the complaint was filed on 1 March 2014.

Invoking Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the applicant sought quashing of the complaint and all consequential proceedings on the ground that the complaint was barred by the three-month limitation prescribed under Section 106 of the Factories Act.

Whether the complaint under Section 7A(2)(b) of the Factories Act, filed on 1 March 2014, was barred by the three-month limitation under Section 106 of the Act.

Whether the High Court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash the time-barred complaint and consequential proceedings as an abuse of process of law.

Section 7A(2)(b) of the Factories Act requires the occupier to ensure the safety and health of workers, including in relation to the handling, storage and transportation of articles and substances.

Section 106 of the Factories Act prohibits a court from taking cognizance of an offence under the Act unless a complaint is made within three months from the date on which the alleged commission of the offence came to the knowledge of an Inspector.

The Court considered P.D. Jambekar v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1973 SC 309, concerning the distinction between knowledge of an accident and knowledge of the commission of an offence.

The Court considered J.J. Irani v. State of Jharkhand, AIR 2014 SC 3735, concerning the commencement of limitation upon knowledge acquired through preliminary investigation.

It also applied the principles in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604, particularly category 102(6), under which proceedings may be quashed where an express legal bar exists to their institution.

Section 482 CrPC empowers the High Court to prevent abuse of the process of court and secure the ends of justice.

The Court held that the Inspector’s knowledge of the alleged statutory breach could not be postponed until the preparation of the final report or the recording of statements on 3 December 2013.

The scene panchnama and the inspections disclosed that heavy paper bundles had been stored one above another and had fallen on the worker, thereby indicating the alleged failure to ensure safe storage.

Since the complainant had participated in the preliminary inquiry and, at the latest, had access to the relevant facts and panchnama by 28 October 2013, the complaint ought to have been filed by 27 January 2014.

Its filing on 1 March 2014 was therefore beyond the three-month period under Section 106.

The subsequent recording of statements of two persons who were not eyewitnesses could not revive or extend the statutory limitation period.

The express limitation bar brought the case within Bhajan Lal category 102(6), making continuation of the prosecution an abuse of process warranting intervention under Section 482 CrPC.

It held that the complaint under Section 7A(2)(b) of the Factories Act was clearly barred by limitation under Section 106, and that continuation of the proceedings was impermissible.

The application was allowed, and Criminal Case No. 861 of 2014, filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Valsad, together with all consequential proceedings, was quashed and set aside qua the applicant.

Rule was made absolute.