Farmers’ challenge to Purandar airport site rejected; Bombay High Court defers to expert and policy decisions on site selection

The Petitioners, agriculturists and landowners from villages in Purandar Taluka, Pune, challenged the decision to establish a Greenfield International Airport at “Site 1A” and sought to restrain acquisition of their lands. Site 1A had received approval from the Airports Authority of India in 2016, a Ministry of Defence NOC in 2018, and Ministry of Civil Aviation site clearance in 2018; administrative approval was thereafter granted for acquisition of approximately 2,367 hectares.

During 2020–2021, an alternative location, “Site 5A”, was examined and an application for aerodrome approval was submitted. Although an NOC was initially granted for Site 5A, it was subsequently cancelled, and approval for Site 1A was restored in May 2024.

The State applied Chapter VI of the Maharashtra Industrial Development Act, 1961 (“MID Act”) to approximately 2,673.982 hectares by notification dated 10 March 2025 and initiated acquisition proceedings. Objections were invited and hearings were conducted under Section 32 of the MID Act.

A final notification under Section 32(1) was issued on 9 February 2026 for acquisition of approximately 1,216.7522 hectares.

The Petitioners contended that Site 1A was technically unsafe and unsuitable, that Site 5A was a superior and less disruptive alternative, and that the extent of acquisition was disproportionate because it involved irrigated, multi-crop agricultural land.

Whether the decision to locate the proposed Greenfield Airport at Site 1A, instead of Site 5A or another alternative site, was arbitrary, irrational, mala fide, technically unsustainable, or otherwise amenable to interference under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Whether the acquisition proceedings undertaken under Chapter VI of the MID Act were illegal or disproportionate so as to warrant judicial interference after issuance of the final notification under Section 32(1).

Whether the Petitioners were entitled to directions restraining acquisition or requiring the authorities to consider alternative locations for the airport.

The Court applied the principle that judicial review under Article 226 does not permit the Court to substitute its own assessment for that of expert and administrative authorities in matters of public infrastructure, site selection, or technical policy, absent mala fides, colourable exercise of power, manifest arbitrariness, statutory violation, or breach of mandatory environmental or safety requirements.

Relying on Union of India v. Kushala Shetty, BALCO Employees’ Union (Regd.) v. Union of India, Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India, State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh, Sooraram Pratap Reddy v. Collector, and Alok Kotahwala v. Jaipur Metro Rail Corporation Ltd., the Court held that the Government and expert planning authorities are ordinarily the best judges of the location and land required for a public project, and that the availability of an alternative parcel does not justify judicial substitution of the Court’s opinion.

The acquisition was examined under Sections 32 and 33 of the MID Act, with Section 32 governing notification, objections and acquisition, and Section 33 providing the statutory mechanism concerning compensation and related reliefs.

The Court also recognised that deprivation of property under Article 300A must have authority of law, but found no established statutory illegality in the present proceedings.

The Court held that Site 5A had only been explored as an alternative and had never been finally selected; its NOC was subsequently cancelled, while approval for Site 1A was restored.

The choice between the two sites involved technical, operational, safety, defence, expansion, alignment and public-interest considerations falling within the competence of the authorities and specialised agencies. The Petitioners’ disagreement with that assessment, without cogent evidence of mala fides, manifest arbitrariness, statutory breach or illegality, could not justify a comparative technical review by the Writ Court.

As to acquisition, the Court noted that statutory notifications had been issued, objections had been invited and considered, and the final notification under Section 32(1) had been issued after substantial progress in the proceedings.

The Court therefore found no sufficient basis to halt or invalidate the acquisition on the grounds advanced. However, it expressly preserved the Petitioners’ liberty to pursue individual statutory grievances concerning compliance, compensation or disbursement under the applicable remedies.

It held that the Petitioners could not require the Court to substitute Site 5A or any other location for the site selected by the competent authorities.

No order as to costs was made.

The Court clarified that it had expressed no opinion on individual statutory claims relating to acquisition compliance, compensation or disbursement, for which the landowners remained free to pursue appropriate statutory remedies.