Financial contributions by sons do not create proprietary rights in their father’s self-acquired property.

Rangi Lal, the respondent/plaintiff, claimed ownership of property bearing No. 180-A, Kewal Park, Azadpur, Delhi, purchased under a registered Sale Deed dated 29.03.2004.

His sons, Anil Kumar and Ram Ashish, occupied the Ground Floor and First Floor respectively with his permission after their marriages.

Following strained relations, the plaintiff published notices disowning the defendants and issued a legal notice dated 18.11.2019 terminating their permission to occupy the respective portions with effect from 20.11.2019.

The plaintiff thereafter filed a suit for possession, permanent injunction and mesne profits/damages.

The defendants denied that they were licensees and asserted that they had contributed financially towards the purchase, construction and renovation of the property. They also claimed an interest in the property on the basis that it was ancestral.

During the suit, the plaintiff sought judgment on admissions under Order XII Rule 6 CPC.

The defendants had repeatedly admitted that the registered Sale Deed stood in the plaintiff’s favour and that he was the “absolute owner” of the property.

The District Court passed a decree for possession of the Ground Floor and First Floor and granted permanent injunction, while leaving the claims for damages/mesne profits for trial.

The defendants challenged that decree in the present appeal.

1. Whether the defendants’ pleadings contained clear, categorical and unequivocal admissions sufficient to justify a decree for possession under Order XII Rule 6 CPC.

2. Whether the defendants’ alleged financial contributions towards construction or renovation created an independent proprietary right or otherwise constituted a triable defence to the plaintiff’s claim for possession.

3. Whether the plea that the property was ancestral raised a genuine triable issue despite the admitted registered Sale Deed in favour of the plaintiff.

4. Whether the absence of a written licence agreement rendered the nature of the defendants’ permissive occupation disputed so as to preclude a decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC.

5. Whether the alleged construction or financial expenditure rendered the licence irrevocable under Section 60(b) of the Indian Easements Act, 1882.

The Court applied Order XII Rule 6 CPC, under which a decree may be passed on clear admissions contained in the pleadings where no genuine triable issue survives regarding the relief sought.

Under Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882, a licence is a permissive right to do something on another’s property and does not create any interest in the property.

Under Section 60(b), a licence may become irrevocable only where the licensee, acting upon the licence, executes a work of permanent character and incurs expenses in its execution; the burden of establishing all these ingredients lies on the licensee.

The Court relied on Shankar Gopinath Apte v. Gangabai Hariharrao Patwardhan, (1976) 4 SCC 112, for the requirement that the work must be executed “acting upon the licence”; Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College, (1987) 2 SCC 555, for the requirement of a direct nexus between the permanent construction and the licence; and Mumbai International Airport Pvt. Ltd. v. Golden Chariot Airport, (2010) 10 SCC 422, for the principle that mere expenditure or investment does not make a licence irrevocable.

The Court further relied on C.N. Arunachala Mudaliar v. C.A. Muruganatha Mudaliar, AIR 1953 SC 495, and Govindbhai Chhotabhai Patel v. Patel Ramanbhai Mathurbhai, Civil Appeal No. 7528/2019, for the distinction between self-acquired and ancestral property and the burden on the person asserting ancestral character.

The discretionary nature of Order XII Rule 6 CPC, relied upon by the defendants through S.M. Asif v. Virender Kumar Bajaj, (2015) 9 SCC 287, and Vijay Kumar Jain v. Suresh Kumar Jain, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 2229, did not assist them because the Court found no genuine issue requiring trial in relation to possession.

The Court held that the defendants had repeatedly admitted both the registered Sale Deed in the plaintiff’s favour and his status as the “absolute owner” of the property.

Their assertion that they had contributed earnings towards construction or renovation did not identify any joint acquisition, transfer, conveyance, family arrangement or other legal basis by which a proprietary interest was created in their favour.

Even proof of financial contribution would not, by itself, make them co-owners.

The plea of ancestral property was unsupported by any particulars concerning the ancestor, devolution or the manner in which the property purchased from third parties could acquire ancestral character.

The Court further held that permissive occupation need not be created by a written licence agreement. The defendants’ occupation as sons permitted to reside in specific portions of their father’s property was capable of being treated as a licence.

Section 60(b) was also inapplicable because the defendants neither pleaded that the plaintiff authorised them, as licensees, to execute a permanent work nor established that any such work was undertaken pursuant to the licence.

Merely handing over earnings which were allegedly used for construction was not equivalent to executing a permanent work while acting upon the licence.

The prior framing of issues did not bar recourse to Order XII Rule 6 CPC where no genuine triable issue survived concerning possession.

Their repeated admissions established the plaintiff’s ownership, while their pleas of financial contribution, ancestral property and irrevocable licence did not disclose any independent right, title or interest permitting them to retain possession.

Withdrawal of permission through the legal notice dated 18.11.2019 rendered their continued occupation unauthorised from 20.11.2019.

The appeal was accordingly dismissed, and the decree for possession of the Ground Floor and First Floor and permanent injunction restraining interference and creation of third-party rights was upheld.

The claims for damages/mesne profits remained subject to adjudication in the suit.