Forensic evidence alone cannot establish rape where material contradictions create reasonable doubt.

The appellant, the sole accused, was prosecuted in Sessions Case No. 879/2018 for allegedly administering the prosecutrix an intoxicating or stupefying substance at his clinic on 25.04.2017, causing her to lose consciousness, and raping her during that period; charges were framed under Sections 328 and 376 IPC.

The prosecution relied principally on the prosecutrix’s testimony, her FIR, medical and forensic evidence, and the FSL report detecting semen and a DNA profile matching the appellant’s blood sample.

The trial court acquitted the appellant under Section 328 IPC but convicted him under Section 376 IPC and sentenced him to seven years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of ₹4,12,000.

In appeal, the appellant contended that he had been falsely implicated for extortion and relied on the evidence of the clinic receptionist and his own testimony.

The High Court proceeded to decide the appeal on merits despite the appellant’s non-appearance.

Whether the testimony of the prosecutrix was sufficiently consistent, reliable, and confidence-inspiring to sustain the appellant’s conviction for rape under Section 376 IPC.

Whether the medical and forensic evidence, including the DNA evidence, independently established the commission of rape by the appellant despite the material inconsistencies in the prosecutrix’s statements.

Whether the prosecution had proved the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt so as to justify confirmation of the conviction and sentence.

The Court applied Section 376 IPC concerning rape and the criminal-law standard requiring the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

It relied on Ganesan v. State, (2020) 10 SCC 573, for the principle that a conviction for rape may rest solely on the prosecutrix’s testimony where it is wholly reliable and inspires confidence, but that material contradictions and inconsistencies affecting the root of the prosecution case require cautious judicial scrutiny.

The Court further held that expert and forensic evidence admissible under Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, is corroborative and assists the Court but is not binding or, by itself, conclusive of rape.

It also referred to Bani Singh v. State of U.P., (1996) 4 SCC 720, in permitting the appellate court to decide the appeal on merits in the appellant’s absence, and observed that non-compliance with Section 232 Cr.P.C. does not automatically vitiate proceedings absent demonstrated prejudice.

The Court found material and unexplained inconsistencies between the prosecutrix’s FIR, her Section 164 Cr.P.C. statement, and her deposition.

The FIR alleged that the appellant administered an injection, caused her partial unconsciousness, and raped her, whereas her Section 164 statement stated that she became unconscious on reaching the clinic, was awakened by water being splashed on her, and expressly stated that no one had done anything wrong to her.

Since the prosecutrix affirmed in cross-examination that her Section 164 statement was voluntary, correct, and made in full consciousness, that statement substantially contradicted her later allegation of rape.

The prosecution also produced no scientific result establishing that any intoxicant had been administered, and the trial court itself had not convicted the appellant under Section 328 IPC.

Although the FSL report linked semen recovered from the prosecutrix’s samples and jeans to the appellant’s DNA, the Court held that such evidence could corroborate a reliable account but could not, in the circumstances, independently prove rape, particularly when the prosecutrix’s own prior statement denied that any wrong had been done to her.

The presence of the receptionist at the clinic, the absence of any allegation that he was involved, and the non-examination of other persons allegedly present further weakened the prosecution case.

Accordingly, the Court held that the prosecution had failed to discharge its initial burden beyond reasonable doubt, irrespective of whether the defence evidence was wholly credible.

The appeal was allowed; the judgment of conviction dated 31.08.2024 and order on sentence dated 16.10.2024 were set aside.

The appellant was acquitted under Section 235(1) Cr.P.C. of the offence under Section 376 IPC, directed to be set at liberty, and his bail bonds were cancelled.