Fraud under Section 25(iii) requires clear proof of active concealment or silence breaching a duty to disclose.

The parties married on 22 February 2016 through a social Hindu ceremony and registered the marriage under the Special Marriage Act, 1954.

The appellant-husband instituted a suit seeking annulment under Section 25(iii) of the Act, alleging that his consent had been obtained by fraud because the respondent-wife and her family concealed her history of Idiopathic Thrombocytopenic Purpura (ITP) following splenectomy, from which she had allegedly suffered since 2007.

The respondent denied concealment and asserted that the parties’ families had discussed health matters and that her father had sent her medical file, including prescriptions and blood reports, to the appellant’s father by DTDC courier on 29 January 2016.

The trial court dismissed the suit, holding that concealment and fraudulent intent were not proved, drawing an adverse inference from the non-examination of the appellant’s father, and rejecting the WhatsApp evidence for want of a certificate under Section 65B of the Evidence Act.

The appellant also filed an application under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure alleging perjury by the respondent, which was rejected by the trial court.

1. Whether the appellant proved that his consent to the marriage was obtained by fraud within the meaning of Section 25(iii) of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, by active concealment of the respondent’s medical condition?

2. Whether the alleged non-disclosure of the respondent’s ITP condition constituted fraud when the appellant had the means to make reasonable inquiries before marriage?

3. Whether the evidence on record, including the WhatsApp messages, medical papers, and the respondent’s cross-examination, established concealment, fraudulent intent, and materiality of the medical condition?

4. Whether the respondent’s alleged statements in evidence warranted initiation of proceedings for perjury under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973?

The Court applied Section 25(iii) of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, under which a marriage is voidable where consent was obtained by “coercion or fraud, as defined in the Indian Contract Act, 1872”.

Section 17 of the Contract Act was therefore held applicable, requiring proof of active concealment, an act fitted to deceive, or silence in circumstances creating a duty to speak, coupled with an intention to deceive and induce consent.

Under Section 19 of the Contract Act, a contract is not voidable where the allegedly deceived party had the means of discovering the truth with ordinary diligence.

The burden of proving fraud lay throughout upon the appellant, and fraud had to be established by clear and cogent evidence; a decree of nullity could not be used as an alternative to divorce.

Section 114, Illustration (g) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 permitted an adverse inference where the best available evidence was withheld, while electronic evidence required compliance with Section 65B as applied by the trial court.

Proceedings under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were held to be exceptional and discretionary, requiring a prima facie finding of deliberate and material falsehood warranting action in the interests of justice.

The Court held that the appellant failed to prove the essential elements of fraud. His own plaint admitted that health had been discussed during the marriage negotiations, although that material admission was omitted from his affidavit-in-chief and remained unexplained.

Since the appellant had met the respondent only once before marriage, his family—particularly his father—was central to proving what had been disclosed or concealed. The father’s non-examination justified an adverse inference under Section 114, Illustration (g) of the Evidence Act.

The WhatsApp material was inadmissible for want of the requisite certificate, and the appellant’s method of creating and printing screenshots also affected its evidentiary weight.

Even assuming that the respondent’s medical history had not been expressly disclosed, the Court found that the case involved, at most, silence. The appellant had not made any inquiry of the respondent, her family, or his own father despite having the opportunity to do so before marriage, thereby attracting the ordinary-diligence principle under Section 19 of the Contract Act.

The appellant neither examined a doctor nor proved the medical documents through competent witnesses, and led no expert evidence that ITP post-splenectomy was materially disabling, affected cohabitation or fertility, or rendered the marriage unsafe or unworkable.

The Court further held that the respondent’s unchallenged assertion that her family had disclosed the condition before marriage could not be displaced merely because the appellant disputed it; the burden remained upon him to establish fraud.

Since the underlying allegation of concealment was not proved, the respondent’s evidence did not disclose a deliberate falsehood warranting Section 340 proceedings. Mere contradiction, denial, or an unsuccessful defence was insufficient to establish perjury.

The appeal against rejection of the Section 340 CrPC perjury application was also dismissed, as no deliberate and materially false statement warranting criminal proceedings had been established.

The trial court’s judgment and decree dated 24 December 2025 were affirmed, and the appellant was directed to pay the respondent ₹1,00,000 as costs within four weeks.