Full satisfaction of alternate relief, once unchallenged, bars further execution for specific performance.

The petitioners, decree-holders under a specific-performance decree dated 6 December 2005, filed an execution petition on 12 December 2008. It was returned and subsequently re-presented; the petitioners sought condonation of a 2,456-day delay in representing it, attributing the delay in part to court bifurcation.

The decree required the defendants to execute a registered sale deed within two months and also provided alternative relief for refund of the advance with interest. The petitioners deposited the remaining sale consideration of Rs.15,000 on 7 August 2006, about eight months after the decree.

In 2019, the Executing Court recorded full satisfaction of the decree after the judgment-debtors deposited the amount due under the alternative refund relief. The petitioners did not challenge that order.

The Executing Court dismissed the delay-condonation application, prompting this revision under Section 115 CPC.

Whether the petitioners established sufficient cause to condone the 2,456-day delay in representing the execution petition.

Whether, after the Executing Court recorded full satisfaction of the decree on the basis of the alternative refund relief—and that order remained unchallenged—the petitioners could pursue execution of the specific-performance relief.

Whether the petitioners’ deposit of the balance sale consideration eight months after the decree was consistent with the decree and the requirement of readiness and willingness.

Under Sections 16(c) and 20 of the Specific Relief Act, specific performance is discretionary and requires the plaintiff to establish readiness and willingness; the Court stated that this obligation continues through satisfaction of the decree.

Where a specific-performance decree requires payment of the balance consideration within a stipulated period, a party seeking more time must apply to the court under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act; the vendor may also seek rescission or oppose execution for non-compliance. The Court relied on V.S. Palanichamy Chettiar Firm v. C. Alagappan, (1999) 4 SCC 702, for these principles.

The revision was brought under Section 115 CPC.

The Court construed the decree’s two-month period for execution of the sale deed together with the obligation to pay the balance consideration, and held that the petitioners should have deposited that amount within the same period or sought an extension under Section 28. Their deposit eight months after the decree, without seeking an extension, was inconsistent with the decree and indicated a lack of readiness and willingness.

More fundamentally, the Executing Court had recorded full satisfaction in 2019 after the alternative refund amount was deposited, and the petitioners had not challenged that order. The Court therefore held that they could not use the delayed representation application to revive execution of the specific-performance relief; the asserted explanation for the representation delay could not cure that impediment.

No costs were awarded.