Facts
The petitioner challenged an order dated 16.03.2026 passed by the Special Mobile Magistrate, Pulwama, which directed the petitioner to pay 10% of the total cheque amount as interim compensation
Source reference: para. 1, 6The respondent had filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments (NI) Act involving eleven cheques totaling several lakhs
Source reference: para. 2-3Upon appearing, the petitioner pleaded not guilty and specifically denied her signatures on the cheques, requesting forensic examination
Source reference: para. 4, 7During the proceedings, the Trial Court allowed the respondent’s application for interim compensation under Section 143-A of the NI Act without addressing the petitioner's specific defense or providing a detailed rationale for the 10% quantum
Source reference: para. 6-7Issues
1. Whether the power to grant interim compensation under Section 143-A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, is mandatory or discretionary
Source reference: para. 172. Whether the Trial Court's order was legally sustainable given the lack of recorded reasons for the grant and the specific quantum of compensation
Source reference: para. 20-22Law Applied
Section 143-A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, which empowers courts to order interim compensation not exceeding 20% of the cheque amount
Source reference: para. 15Supreme Court's interpretation in Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava v. State of Jharkhand (2024), establishing that the word "may" in Section 143-A makes the power discretionary and directory, requiring courts to record brief reasons following a prima facie evaluation of both the complainant's merit and the accused's defense
Source reference: para. 23Nazir Ahmad Chopan v. Abdul Rehman Chopan (2022), which mandates that the court must justify the specific percentage (1% to 20%) awarded through reasoned analysis
Source reference: para. 27-28Reasoning
The High Court observed that the Trial Court exercised its power in a "mechanical" and "routine" manner
Source reference: para. 20, 24It noted that the Magistrate failed to perform a prima facie evaluation of the petitioner’s specific defense regarding the denial of signatures, which is crucial since the presumption under Section 139 is rebuttable
Source reference: para. 10, 21The Court found that the impugned order merely reiterated the statutory provision without explaining why 10% was the appropriate quantum in this specific case
Source reference: para. 22, 26Since Section 143-A allows a range of compensation, the failure to provide "cogent reasons" for selecting a specific figure rendered the order arbitrary and "in the teeth of the settled position of law"
Source reference: para. 23, 26Holding
The High Court answered that the power under Section 143-A is discretionary and requires a reasoned, non-mechanical approach
The Court allowed the petition, quashed the order dated 16.03.2026, and remanded the matter to the Special Mobile Magistrate, Pulwama
Source reference: para. 29The Trial Court was directed to pass a fresh order expeditiously, ensuring that if it grants interim compensation, it must record reasons considering all relevant factors and the specific defenses raised by the petitioner
Source reference: para. 29The parties were directed to appear before the Trial Court on 27.04.2026
Source reference: para. 31Original Court PDF
NARGEES JAVAIDvsGHULAM JEELANI NENGROO
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