GST appeal deadline starts only after proper communication, not mere portal upload, Rajasthan High Court rules

The petitioner’s GST registration was cancelled by an order dated 26 March 2025, with effect from 6 November 2024, for non-filing of returns.

The petitioner stated that it learned of the cancellation on 10/14 April 2026, filed the outstanding returns and paid the dues, then appealed on 19 April 2026.

The Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal as time-barred, treating the limitation period as running from the effective date of cancellation.

The petitioner challenged that decision by writ petition.

The Revenue contended that uploading the order to the GST portal constituted service.

1. Whether the limitation period under Section 107(1) of the CGST Act begins only when the adjudication order is communicated to the affected person.

2. Whether uploading the order to the GST common portal, without other communication, constitutes sufficient service to start limitation under Sections 107(1) and 169.

3. Whether the appeal could be rejected as time-barred in the circumstances, and what relief should follow.

Section 107(1) of the CGST Act provides a three-month appeal period from communication of the decision or order; the Appellate Authority may condone delay for a further period of one month.

Section 169 prescribes methods for serving decisions and orders, including making them available on the common portal.

The Court relied on Collector of Central Excise, Madras v. M.M. Rubber and Co., Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Qimat Rai Gupta and D. Saibaba v. Bar Council of India for the principle that, where a statutory remedy is provided, limitation ordinarily runs from communication or actual or constructive knowledge of the order.

It also relied on Saral Wire Craft Private Limited v. Commissioner of Customs, Central Excise and Service Tax for the need to serve an affected party meaningfully and in accordance with the prescribed procedure.

Following Singh Enterprises v. Commissioner of Central Excise, the Court held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is excluded once the statutory extension period is exhausted.

The Court treated communication under Section 107(1) as necessary to enable an affected person to exercise the right of appeal, so limitation could not begin merely because the cancellation order specified an earlier effective date.

Although Section 169 includes portal publication as a mode of service, the Court concluded that, on the facts and in light of its reading of Sections 107(1) and 169, portal upload alone did not amount to communication sufficient to start limitation.

As the petitioner had not been otherwise communicated the order and appealed shortly after learning of it, the Appellate Authority erred in dismissing the appeal as time-barred.

It condoned the delay, remanded the appeal for decision on the merits, and clarified that it had expressed no opinion on those merits.