Prior government permission is essential to transfer SC-granted land; later approval cannot validate an earlier sale, Karnataka High Court rules.

In 1982, two acres in Sy.No.57, Singena Agrahara Village, were granted to respondent No.5, a member of a Scheduled Caste.

A sale deed in respect of that land was executed on 16 November 1996 through a GPA holder and presented for registration on 22 November 1996.

The Deputy Commissioner granted permission on 27 May 1997, and the deed was registered on 4 June 1998.

Respondent No.5 later sought restoration under the PTCL Act. The Assistant Commissioner rejected the application in 2008, but the Deputy Commissioner allowed the appeal in 2012. The appellant’s writ petition challenging that order was dismissed in 2021, leading to this appeal.

1. Whether execution of the sale deed before obtaining the Government’s permission constituted a “transfer” prohibited by Sections 3(i)(e) and 4(2) of the PTCL Act, notwithstanding that registration occurred after permission was granted.

2. Whether the delay in seeking restoration barred action under the PTCL Act.

Section 3(i)(e) of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 defines “transfer” broadly to include a sale, an agreement to sell, and other transactions.

Under Section 4(2), granted land cannot be transferred or acquired by transfer without the Government’s previous permission; a transfer in contravention of Section 4 is null and void under Section 4(1).

In Dharma Naika v. Rama Naika, the Supreme Court recognised that the PTCL Act’s broad definition of “transfer” includes an agreement for sale.

Satyan v. Deputy Commissioner held that an eight-year delay does not, by itself, make action under the Act void for delay and laches.

The Court treated the execution and presentation of the deed in November 1996 as a “transfer” within Section 3(i)(e), even if registration had not yet occurred.

Because no prior permission existed when that transaction took place, the later permission—obtained without bringing the already executed and presented deed to the authority’s notice—did not cure the defect.

The Court distinguished decisions concerning when a registered sale takes effect: the relevant question was whether a transfer had occurred before permission, not the effective date of the sale under registration law.

It also held that the cited coordinate Bench decision did not address the broad statutory definition of “transfer”.

The delay objection did not warrant interference, consistently with Satyan.

Finding no ground to interfere with the Single Judge’s decision, it dismissed the writ appeal and disposed of all pending interlocutory applications.