01Facts
The petitioner, a Chartered Accountant, was appointed as a non-executive director of NISU Fincap Limited (formerly Mega Finance and Securities Limited) in 1995 and resigned with effect from 1 April 1997, as recorded in Form No. 32.
p. 2 · p. 6The Registrar of Companies filed Criminal Case No. 136 of 2002, alleging offences under Sections 63, 68 and 628 of the Companies Act, 1956, in connection with the company’s public issue and prospectus dated 5 January 1996; the petitioner was named as an accused and alleged to have been a signatory to the prospectus.
p. 2 · p. 3 · p. 8The petitioner sought quashing under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, contending that he had resigned before the alleged events and had acted only as a professional, non-executive director.
p. 1 · p. 4He also relied on an earlier order quashing a separate FIR against him.
p. 402Issues
i.Whether the complaint disclosed a prima facie basis to prosecute the petitioner under Sections 63, 68 or 628 of the Companies Act, 1956, given his role as a professional director and the nature of his alleged involvement.
p. 5 · p. 6 · p. 7ii.Whether the complaint, filed nearly six years after the prospectus, was barred by limitation under Section 468 of the CrPC in the absence of an explanation or application for condonation.
p. 803Law Applied
Section 63(1) of the Companies Act, 1956 imposes criminal liability for an untrue statement in a prospectus on a person who authorised its issue, while Section 63(2) provides that consent given under Section 58 by an expert for inclusion of their statement does not, by itself, amount to authorisation of the prospectus.
p. 6Section 68 concerns fraudulently inducing persons to invest; Section 628 concerns false statements in documents required under the Act, and the Court treated conscious falsity and the requisite mens rea as necessary to attract liability.
p. 5 · p. 7Under Section 468(2)(c) CrPC, the limitation period for an offence punishable with imprisonment exceeding one year but not exceeding three years is three years; Section 473 permits cognizance after expiry where delay is properly explained or extension is necessary in the interests of justice.
p. 8Relying on Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases, (2014) 2 SCC 62, the Court stated that the relevant date for computing limitation is the filing of the complaint or initiation of criminal proceedings.
p. 8The petition was considered under the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction in Section 482 CrPC.
p. 1Provisions in the judgment · 10 · Linked ones open on LawLens
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 Section 482Section 220Section 468Section 473
Indian Penal Code, 1860 Section 403Section 406Section 415Section 418Section 420Section 424
04Reasoning
The Court found that Form No. 32 recorded the petitioner’s resignation on 1 April 1997 and that the complaint did not allege that he had induced anyone to invest, as required for liability under Section 68.
p. 6 · p. 7As to Section 63, the Court held that expert consent under Section 58 did not, by itself, constitute authorisation of the prospectus under Section 63(2).
p. 7It further found no specific allegations or material showing that the petitioner knowingly or intentionally made a false statement for purposes of Section 628.
p. 7Independently, the prospectus was dated 5 January 1996, while the complaint was dated 21 June 2002; the complaint disclosed no application for condonation or plausible explanation for the delay, which exceeded the three-year period identified by the Court.
p. 805Holding
The Court allowed the petition and quashed Criminal Case No. 136 of 2002, together with all consequential proceedings, insofar as they concerned the petitioner.
p. 9The Rule was made absolute to that extent.
p. 9Original Court PDF
GAURANG SHETHWALA S/O MULCHANDAS SHETHWALAvsSTATE OF GUJARAT
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