High Court cannot quash proceedings under Section 528 BNSS by assessing the accused’s defence or conducting a mini-trial.

The petitioner challenged the order dated 08.08.2024 passed by the Judicial Magistrate-I, Jamshedpur, taking cognizance of offences under Section 33 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927, as amended by the Bihar Amendment Act, 1989, and Sections 27 and 29 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972.

The prosecution alleged that the petitioner had trespassed into the forest area and undertaken further construction of her house within the protected forest area, forming part of the Dalma Wildlife Sanctuary.

The petitioner contended that she was the lawful owner and occupier of the land, paid holding tax to the Jamshedpur Notified Area Committee, and that the work in question was merely repair work rather than fresh construction or encroachment.

The State opposed the petition, submitting that the allegations disclosed unauthorized entry into the sanctuary, clearing of forest land, and destruction or damage to wildlife habitat; it also argued that the petitioner’s ownership claim was a defence requiring evidence at trial.

The case was fixed for consideration of framing of charge on 27.08.2026.

1. Whether the High Court should quash the order taking cognizance under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, where the petitioner disputes the prosecution allegations and asserts lawful ownership and that the construction was only repair work?

2. Whether the allegations of unauthorized entry into the Dalma Wildlife Sanctuary, clearing of forest land, and destruction or damage to wildlife habitat disclose a prima facie case warranting continuation of the criminal proceedings?

3. Whether the High Court could evaluate the petitioner’s defence and undertake an appreciation of evidence at the stage of exercising its inherent jurisdiction?

The Court exercised its inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, corresponding to Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

It applied the settled rule that the accused’s defence and the veracity or evidentiary value of materials relied upon by the accused cannot ordinarily be examined in proceedings for quashing, as those matters fall within the province of the trial court; the Court relied on State of Madhya Pradesh v. Awadh Kishore Gupta & Ors., (2004) 2 Supreme 501.

It further relied on State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. v. Akhil Sharda & Ors., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 594, holding that the High Court cannot conduct a mini-trial or undertake appreciation of evidence while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC, and consequently under Section 528 BNSS.

The Court also considered the statutory prohibitions concerning forest clearing under Section 30 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927, and restrictions and prohibitions relating to entry into sanctuaries and interference with wildlife habitat under Sections 27 and 29 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972; the penal consequence under the latter enactment is provided by Section 51.

The Court found that the prosecution contained direct and specific allegations that the petitioner had entered the Dalma Wildlife Sanctuary without authority, cleared forest land, and destroyed or damaged wildlife habitat.

These allegations were sufficient to disclose a prima facie case under the relevant forest and wildlife-protection provisions.

The petitioner’s assertions that she was the lawful owner and that the work was merely repair work involved disputed questions of fact and constituted her defence.

Determining those claims would require consideration of evidence and could not be undertaken by the High Court without conducting a prohibited mini-trial under Section 528 BNSS.

Accordingly, the Court held that the case did not fall within the exceptional category warranting quashing of the proceedings.

It declined to examine the petitioner’s ownership and repair-work claims at the quashing stage and dismissed Cr.M.P. No. 3492 of 2025 as without merit.

The interlocutory application seeking early hearing was disposed of as infructuous because the main petition had been heard.