High Courts may quash non-compoundable criminal proceedings after private settlement where conviction is unlikely.

The petitioners sought quashing of FIR No. 68/2026, registered on 25 March 2026 at P.S. Jafrabad under Sections 115(2), 333, 331(1) and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (“BNS”), arising from an alleged incident dated 21 March 2026.

The petitioners and respondent no. 2 were neighbours and residents of Delhi; the FIR had been lodged at the instance of respondent no. 2, and the charge-sheet had not yet been filed.

During the proceedings, the parties entered into a Deed of Settlement dated 14 August 2026, stating that they had amicably resolved all disputes without pressure, force or coercion and that respondent no. 2 had received no settlement amount.

Respondent no. 2 appeared before the Court and affirmed the voluntary execution of the settlement.

1. Whether the High Court could exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, to quash an FIR involving a non-compoundable offence on the basis of an amicable settlement between the parties.

2. Whether, in view of the settlement between the neighbouring parties, continuation of the criminal proceedings would serve any useful purpose or would instead amount to an abuse of the process of law.

The Court applied Section 528 of the BNSS, corresponding to Section 482 of the CrPC, which preserves the High Court’s inherent power to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of the process of any court.

It relied on Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303, which holds that criminal proceedings may be quashed on the basis of compromise even where the offence is non-compoundable if the dispute is predominantly private or civil in character, the possibility of conviction is remote, and continuation of proceedings would defeat the ends of justice; however, serious offences involving mental depravity or grave impact on society ordinarily cannot be quashed merely on settlement.

It further relied on Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466, which requires the High Court to exercise this power sparingly and with caution, guided by the ends of justice or prevention of abuse of process, and to consider whether the dispute has been completely settled and whether the likelihood of conviction is remote.

The Court also noted that, except Section 333 BNS, the offences invoked were compoundable.

The Court found that the prosecution arose from an inter se dispute between neighbours and that the parties had fully and voluntarily resolved their differences through the Deed of Settlement dated 14 August 2026.

Since respondent no. 2, the complainant, confirmed the settlement before the Court and did not seek continuation of the prosecution, the prospect of conviction was considered remote.

Applying the principles in Gian Singh and Narinder Singh, the Court held that continuation of the proceedings would be futile, unnecessarily consume judicial resources, and serve no useful purpose; quashing the FIR would therefore advance the ends of justice and prevent abuse of process.

The petitioners were directed to deposit consolidated costs of ₹15,000 with the Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee and to file proof of deposit through counsel.

The parties were directed to remain bound by the terms of the Deed of Settlement dated 14 August 2026, and the petition was disposed of accordingly.