Husband’s Brother And Sister-in-Law Acquitted In Dowry-Death Case As Jharkhand HC Finds No Specific Evidence Of Cruelty Or Active Role

Rinku Devi died from burn injuries in May 2012, within two years of her marriage to Ratan Bauri.

Her mother alleged that her in-laws had demanded ₹50,000 and a motorcycle and that her mother-in-law and husband set her on fire, while the appellants—her husband’s brother and sister-in-law—were present and did not intervene.

The appellants were convicted under Section 304-B IPC and sentenced to seven years’ rigorous imprisonment. They appealed, disputing the evidence of dowry-related cruelty and their involvement.

Section 304-B IPC requires proof that a woman died from burns, bodily injury, or otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of marriage, and that soon before her death she was subjected by her husband or a relative of her husband to cruelty or harassment in connection with a dowry demand; “soon before” requires a proximate and live link, not necessarily conduct immediately preceding death (*Major Singh v. State of Punjab*; *Satbir Singh v. State of Haryana*; *Surinder Singh v. State of Haryana*).

Once those foundational facts are shown, Section 113-B of the Evidence Act requires the court to presume that the accused caused the dowry death.

General or omnibus allegations against relatives, without specific supporting material, require careful scrutiny (*Monju Roy v. State of W.B.*; *Kans Raj v. State of Punjab*); the prosecution must prove the accused’s dowry-related cruelty or harassment.

The prosecution must prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and reasonable doubt must benefit the accused.

The Court accepted that the deceased’s death was unnatural and occurred within seven years of marriage.

However, the specific allegations that kerosene was poured and the fire ignited were directed at the mother-in-law and husband. As to the appellants, the evidence was general: they were said to have been present, to have failed to rescue the deceased, or to have been involved in a conspiracy.

The record did not establish specific dowry-related cruelty or harassment by either appellant, so the statutory foundation for applying Section 113-B was not made out against them.

The Court also noted that Section 34 IPC had not been invoked and found no cogent evidence of their active participation or shared common intention.

It allowed the appeal, set aside their convictions, acquitted them, and discharged their bail bonds.