Illegal termination does not mandate reinstatement; courts may award compensation based on circumstances.

Vijay Singh was engaged by the State Bank of India as a temporary Waterboy-cum-Messenger at its Baraut Branch from July 1994.

His services were discontinued on 10 October 1996 without notice, notice pay, or retrenchment compensation.

He raised an industrial dispute, and the Labour Court held that he had worked for more than 240 days and that the termination violated Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

It directed reinstatement with 50% back wages.

The Bank challenged the award under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

During the writ proceedings, operation of the award was stayed subject to the Bank depositing 50% of the back wages.

Section 25B(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 provides that a workman is deemed to be in continuous service if he has actually worked for at least 240 days during the twelve months preceding termination.

The initial burden of proving 240 days of actual work lies on the workman, who must ordinarily adduce cogent oral and documentary evidence; an adverse inference against the employer depends on the facts of the case, as held in R.M. Yellatti v. Assistant Executive Engineer, (2006) 1 SCC 106, and Municipal Corporation, Faridabad v. Siri Niwas, (2004) 8 SCC 195.

Under Section 25F, a workman satisfying the continuous-service requirement cannot be retrenched without compliance with the statutory requirements of notice or notice pay and retrenchment compensation.

In writ jurisdiction, the High Court does not ordinarily reappreciate factual findings of the Labour Court and may interfere only where the findings are perverse, unsupported by evidence, patently illegal, or jurisdictionally erroneous, as stated in International Airport Authority of India v. International Air Cargo Workers’ Union, (2009) 13 SCC 374.

Reinstatement with back wages is not automatic upon a finding of illegal termination; the relief may be moulded by awarding compensation depending on the nature and duration of employment and surrounding circumstances, as held in Jagbir Singh v. Haryana State Agriculture Marketing Board, (2009) 15 SCC 327, and Allahabad Bank v. Krishan Pal Singh, (2021) 19 SCC 227.

The High Court found that the respondent had discharged the initial burden under Section 25B(2).

The Bank’s own communication dated 30 December 1997 recorded that Singh had worked as a daily-wage Waterboy for 712 days and had submitted 412 conveyance bills for official outdoor duties.

This evidence was corroborated by duty charts, conveyance bills, Peon Book entries, the identity certificate describing him as a temporary Messenger/Waterboy, and the Branch Manager’s evidence that the relevant bills had been passed and included water-carrier, rickshaw, and other outdoor-service charges.

The fact that he worked only two or three hours on particular days did not negate the finding that he had worked on the requisite number of days.

Since the Bank admittedly did not issue notice, pay notice pay, or provide retrenchment compensation, the termination violated Section 25F; the absence of a sanctioned post or regular recruitment did not permit the Bank to bypass that statutory protection.

However, considering that the engagement was temporary, lasted approximately two years, the termination occurred in 1996, nearly thirty years had elapsed, and the respondent had already received approximately ₹9,87,925 under Section 17B, the Court held that reinstatement with back wages would not be appropriate.

Nevertheless, it modified the relief by substituting reinstatement and 50% back wages with lump-sum monetary compensation.

The amount deposited by the Bank pursuant to the interim order dated 14 July 2010 was directed to be released to Singh as compensation in lieu of reinstatement and back wages.

No further amount or Section 17B allowance was held payable.

The writ petition was accordingly disposed of and the Labour Court’s award was modified.