Incorporated sale-agreement terms and broad conveyance clauses transferred appurtenant common-driveway rights to purchasers.

The plaintiffs/respondent nos. 1 and 2, purchasers of flats at Premises No. 36B, Panditiya Road, instituted a suit seeking declaration of their undivided share or interest in an open driveway connecting Premises Nos. 36B and 37 and the central lawn within the Fort Oasis project, together with declarations against the defendants’ title and injunctions against encroachment, disturbance of possession, construction, alteration or demarcation of the property.

The appellant owned a flat at Premises No. 36A; other defendants were owners or lessees in Premises Nos. 36B and 37.

The Trial Court granted an ex parte ad interim injunction restraining interference with the plaintiffs’ possession and construction or alteration over the suit property by Order No. 2 dated 16 May 2026. F.M.A. No. 813 of 2026 challenged that order, while F.M.A. No. 872 of 2026 challenged subsequent orders mechanically extending it.

The appellant contended that the driveway and central lawn were not conveyed under the plaintiffs’ or their predecessor’s deeds, were not shown as joint property in the sanctioned plan, and that the plaintiffs had not established title or possession.

The plaintiffs relied on the agreements and conveyances referring to common facilities and passageways serving Premises Nos. 36A, 36B and 37, and asserted possession over the driveway.

1. Whether the plaintiffs had established a prima facie right or interest in the suit driveway and central lawn through their title deeds, the predecessor’s conveyance, and the agreements incorporated therein.

2. Whether the plaintiffs had made out a prima facie case of possession over the suit property sufficient to justify an ex parte ad interim injunction.

3. Whether the Trial Court’s injunction order was so unreasoned, perverse, arbitrary or legally erroneous as to warrant appellate interference under Order XLIII of the Code of Civil Procedure.

4. Whether the subsequent orders extending the original ex parte ad interim injunction could stand once the original injunction order was examined on merits.

The Court applied the principles governing temporary and ex parte ad interim injunctions under the Code of Civil Procedure, including the requirements of a prima facie case, possession and protection against threatened interference, while recognising that an ex parte court should ordinarily consider the plaint, injunction application and documents relied upon therein and should not conduct a mini-trial.

Under Order XLIII of the Code, appellate interference with an interlocutory injunction is warranted where the order is perverse, arbitrary, capricious, unreasoned or otherwise outside the permissible exercise of judicial discretion; a mere alternative view on facts or law is insufficient.

The Court relied on Bloomberg Television Production Services India Private Limited v. Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited, (2025) 1 SCC 741, regarding the consequences of an unreasoned injunction order, and Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish Ambalal Choksi, (2024) 11 SCC 351, regarding the stringent standard for appellate interference with injunction orders.

It also applied Union of India representing South Eastern Railway v. Amarendra Nath Sarkara, AIR 1967 Cal 119, that the operative part of a deed prevails over its recitals where the operative clause is clear; where ambiguity exists, the recitals may be consulted to ascertain the parties’ intention.

Contractual terms incorporated by reference into a conveyance form part of the rights and obligations conveyed.

The Court found that the predecessor’s agreement for sale dated 23 September 2009 referred to the January 2006 arrangement under which facilities, including passageways and common paths, were to remain common to the developments at Premises Nos. 36A, 36B and 38/1/37.

Although the appellant was not a signatory to the 2009 agreement, Fort Projects Private Limited, of which the appellant formed part, was involved in the relevant arrangement, and the pleadings alleged a common Fort Group development.

The predecessor’s conveyance expressly incorporated the terms, rights and obligations of the agreement for sale, thereby including the common rights described therein.

The plaintiffs’ 2020 conveyance used broad language covering common areas, facilities, easements, quasi-easements and other rights appurtenant or reputed to be appurtenant to the flat; driveways were included in the common facilities, and the vendors had not reserved the disputed right in the exclusion schedule.

Consequently, the plaintiffs had a sufficient prima facie basis for claiming rights over the driveway and related common spaces.

The Court also accepted the plaint’s assertion of possession, independently of the appellant’s alleged admission in its stay application, and found that the photographs showed a driveway lying between the premises and not clearly forming part of Premises No. 36A.

Since the Trial Court had considered the pleadings and photographic materials and had acted within the limited scope of an ex parte injunction inquiry, its order was neither perverse nor unreasoned. The appellate court therefore found no basis for interference under the applicable Order XLIII principles.

F.M.A. No. 813 of 2026 was dismissed on contest, affirming Order No. 2 dated 16 May 2026 passed by the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Ninth Court at Alipore.

F.M.A. No. 872 of 2026 was also dismissed, and the orders dated 8 June 2026 and 16 June 2026 extending the injunction were affirmed.

The connected applications, CAN 1 of 2026 in both appeals, were disposed of consequentially, with no order as to costs.