Inherent powers cannot bypass express thirty-day statutory limitations for restoration applications under NCLT Rules.

The Appellant filed a Section 9 petition [CP (IB) No. 1 of 2020] against the Respondent, which the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT, Indore) dismissed for non-prosecution on 25.03.2022 after the Appellant's counsel failed to appear for four consecutive hearings

The Appellant filed a restoration application [IA No. 195 (MP) of 2022] on 13.08.2022, approximately 111 days beyond the 30-day limitation period prescribed by the NCLT Rules

The Appellant contended that it was unaware of the dismissal until 28.07.2022 because its erstwhile counsel failed to communicate the status of the case due to family health issues during the COVID-19 period

The NCLT rejected the restoration application on 11.12.2024, citing the delay and the lack of a formal condonation of delay application

1. Whether the inherent powers of the Tribunal under Rules 11 and 15 of the NCLT Rules, 2016, can be invoked to restore a petition beyond the 30-day limit prescribed under Rule 48(2)

2. Whether the negligence or lack of communication by a counsel constitutes "sufficient cause" for condoning a significant delay in filing a restoration application under the IBC framework

3. Whether a formal written application for condonation of delay is a mandatory prerequisite for the exercise of discretionary powers under Section 5 of the Limitation Act

Rule 48(2) of the NCLT Rules, 2016, which mandates that restoration applications for petitions dismissed for default must be filed within 30 days upon showing "sufficient cause"

Rule 11 (Inherent Powers) and Rule 15 (Power to extend time), which allow the Tribunal to meet the ends of justice or enlarge timeframes

The Supreme Court's holding in GLAS Trust Company LLC v. BYJU Raveendran, which establishes that inherent powers cannot override express statutory provisions or be used to bypass prescribed procedures

The principle from Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy that a liberal approach to condonation of delay cannot be extended to cases of gross negligence or deliberate inaction

The Tribunal reasoned that while Section 5 of the Limitation Act and Rule 15 of the NCLT Rules grant discretionary powers to condone delay without a formal application if "sufficient cause" is evident, the substance of the explanation must be robust

In this case, the Appellant’s explanation was deemed insufficient because the petition had remained unattended for four consecutive hearings prior to dismissal, indicating a lack of diligence

The Tribunal emphasized that Rule 48(2) provides an express 30-day limit; following GLAS Trust, inherent powers under Rule 11 cannot be invoked to bypass this specific procedural requirement in a manner that undermines the time-bound discipline of the IBC

The court distinguished the Appellant's cited precedents by noting that the negligence of counsel does not automatically entitle a litigant to relief, especially when the litigant fails to monitor the proceedings for several months

Consequently, the 111-day delay was classified as "gross negligence" rather than a bona fide lapse

The Tribunal found no infirmity in the NCLT's order rejecting the restoration application

All related interlocutory applications were disposed of, and no order as to costs was made