Inordinate delay and fence-sitting disentitle employees from belatedly claiming benefits granted to similarly situated persons.

The applicant, a retired CSBO Grade-I employee, filed Miscellaneous Application No. 444 of 2024 seeking condonation of delay in filing an Original Application registered as Diary No. 524 of 2024.

In the proposed Original Application, he sought extension of the benefits granted in O.A. No. 3204/2011, Madhusudan & Ors. v. Union of India, decided by the CAT, Principal Bench on 26 October 2015, and O.A. No. 995/2021, Vijay Kumar Gupta & Ors. v. Union of India, decided by the CAT, Allahabad Bench on 31 October 2023.

The substantive relief sought was financial upgradation under the MACP Scheme in Grade Pay of ₹4,600 upon completion of 20 years of regular service, together with arrears, interest and consequential benefits.

The applicant asserted that he learned of the relevant orders and his alleged entitlement only in January 2024, after which he made enquiries and approached the Tribunal.

The respondents opposed condonation, submitting that the applicant had retired approximately 13 years earlier, had accepted his retiral benefits, and had failed to explain the delay or provide a day-to-day account.

Whether the applicant had shown sufficient and plausible cause for condoning the delay in filing the Original Application under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985?

Whether an employee who remained inactive for approximately 13 years after retirement could claim the benefit of judgments obtained by similarly situated employees after an inordinate delay?

Whether the Original Application was liable to be dismissed as time-barred upon dismissal of the delay-condonation application?

The Tribunal applied Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, under which an Original Application is ordinarily required to be filed within the prescribed limitation period, subject to condonation upon sufficient cause.

It relied on the doctrine of delay and laches, under which a litigant seeking discretionary and equitable relief must provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation for the delay; mere subsequent awareness of a favourable judgment is not, by itself, sufficient.

The Tribunal followed Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108, holding that inordinate delay reflects inaction and may prejudice settled rights and the administration of justice.

It also applied the principle stated in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava, (2015) 1 SCC 347, that employees who acquiesce in an alleged wrong and approach the court only after similarly situated persons succeed are generally treated as fence-sitters and cannot ordinarily claim the benefit of those judgments; an exception may arise where the judgment is in rem and intended to benefit all similarly situated persons.

The Tribunal found that the applicant had approached it in 2024, approximately 13 years after retirement, and had not furnished any satisfactory explanation for the prolonged delay or a day-to-day account of the period of inaction.

His assertion that he became aware of the relevant judgments only in January 2024 did not adequately explain why he had failed to challenge the alleged denial of the MACP benefit during the preceding years.

Applying the principles of delay, laches and acquiescence, the Tribunal held that the applicant had remained a fence-sitter and sought to invoke judgments obtained by other employees only after their success.

The Tribunal further observed that the exception for judgments in rem was not shown to apply in the present case.

Since no cogent or convincing cause was established, the delay could not be condoned under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act.

Consequently, Diary No. 524 of 2024, representing the proposed Original Application, was dismissed as time-barred.

No order was made as to costs, and any pending miscellaneous application was disposed of.