Inordinate delay cannot be condoned without a credible and sufficient explanation, including alleged lack of knowledge.

The appellant challenged the order dated 27 August 2019 passed by the learned Single Judge in CWJC No. 14150 of 2014 by filing the present Letters Patent Appeal on 23/24 March 2023.

The appeal was accompanied by an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, seeking condonation of a delay of 1,275 days.

The appellant contended that the order dated 27 August 2019 had not been communicated to him and that he became aware of it only after meeting his counsel at Patna on 9 March 2023, following which he consulted another counsel and prepared the appeal.

The Court also considered the period excluded by the Supreme Court during the COVID-19 pandemic, but found that a substantial delay of approximately two years still remained unexplained.

Whether the appellant had shown “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for condonation of the 1,275-day delay in filing the Letters Patent Appeal?

Whether the appellant’s plea that he lacked knowledge of the Single Judge’s order until 9 March 2023 constituted a plausible and satisfactory explanation for the entire period of delay?

Whether the appeal could be considered on its merits when the delay in filing it had not been satisfactorily explained?

The Court applied Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, under which delay may be condoned only upon the applicant demonstrating “sufficient cause.”

Relying on Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Executive Engineer, (2008) 17 SCC 448, and P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, (1997) 7 SCC 556, the Court held that limitation must be applied with statutory rigour and cannot ordinarily be extended on equitable grounds.

The Court further relied on Thirunagalingam v. Lingeswaran, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1093, and H. Guruswamy v. A. Krishnaiah, (2025) 11 SCC 440, for the propositions that the bona fides and adequacy of the explanation must be examined before considering the merits, that the length of delay is relevant, and that substantial justice cannot be invoked to defeat the law of limitation.

Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649, was relied upon for the principles that a liberal approach must remain reasonable, gross negligence and lack of bona fides are relevant, and inordinate delay requires a stricter approach.

The Court found the delay of 1,275 days to be inordinate and held that the appellant’s assertion that he remained unaware of the order for approximately three and a half years was not believable or adequately supported.

Applying the requirement of “sufficient cause” under Section 5 and the precedents requiring bona fide, reasonable, and specific explanations, the Court concluded that the appellant had not accounted for the entire period of inaction.

The Court emphasised that the merits of the proposed appeal could not be examined first or used to justify condonation where the explanation for delay itself was deficient.

The appellant’s failure to demonstrate reasonable diligence therefore disentitled him to discretionary relief.

The application for condonation of delay, I.A. No. 1 of 2023, was dismissed.

Consequently, Letters Patent Appeal No. 522 of 2023 was dismissed as barred by delay, without examination of the merits of the challenge to the Single Judge’s order.