Interim injunction may restrain pendente lite alienation despite Section 52’s lis pendens doctrine.

The appellant claimed that the deceased father of respondent no. 1 had agreed to sell 13.5 kathas of land comprised in Khata No. 50, Khesra No. 548, situated within Phulwarisharif Circle, Patna, for ₹1,68,75,000. The appellant alleged that he had paid approximately ₹1 crore between 9 September 2016 and 10 April 2021. Execution of the sale deed was allegedly delayed because a high-tension electric wire stood over the land, which the appellant claimed to have caused to be removed.

After the vendor’s death in April 2021, respondent no. 1 allegedly refused to execute the sale deed and began negotiating with land brokers. The appellant instituted Title Suit No. 56 of 2022 seeking specific performance and filed an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 CPC to restrain alienation of the suit property.

By order dated 16 May 2025, the trial court rejected the injunction application, holding that the appellant had failed to establish a prima facie case, balance of convenience, or irreparable injury. During the appeal, respondent no. 1 allegedly alienated the entire suit property in favour of several subsequent purchasers, making the original injunction prayer infructuous.

1. Whether the trial court erred in refusing temporary injunction despite the appellant’s pleaded agreement to sell, substantial alleged payment, and apprehension of alienation of the suit property.

2. Whether an injunction restraining pendente lite alienation could be granted notwithstanding the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

3. Whether, after alienation had already taken place during the appeal, the appellate court could grant effective interim relief or should issue consequential directions concerning impleadment and expeditious disposal of the title suit.

The court applied Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC and Section 151 CPC, under which temporary injunction may be granted where the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and the likelihood of irreparable injury.

Relying on Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish Ambalal Choksi, Civil Appeal No. 13001 of 2024, and Anand Prasad Agarwal v. Tarkeshwar Prasad, (2001) 5 SCC 568, the court held that a mini-trial is impermissible at the interlocutory stage and that a prima facie case is a substantial, bona fide question requiring adjudication at trial, not proof of prima facie title.

The court also relied on Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh, (1992) 1 SCC 719, for the three governing requirements of interim injunction.

It further held, following Ramakant Ambalal Choksi and the reasoning quoted from Mahesh Kumar v. Omaira Buildcon, that Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act does not by itself eliminate the court’s power to restrain pendente lite transfers under Order XXXIX CPC.

Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co., (1995) 5 SCC 545, was distinguished as concerning equitable relief and the conduct of a party seeking vacation of an injunction; it did not justify rejection of the appellant’s application on the facts of the present case.

The High Court considered that the appellant had raised a substantial and bona fide claim based on the alleged agreement to sell and substantial payments, while the proposed alienation threatened to complicate the specific-performance suit and create third-party rights.

The trial court’s focus on the appellant’s failure to establish ownership or explain irreparable loss was held to be legally erroneous because the suit itself sought execution and registration of a sale deed, and alienation during its pendency could materially prejudice the relief claimed.

The trial court had also relied on Gujarat Bottling out of context and failed to apply the principles governing interim protection against alienation.

The High Court observed that, had the property not already been transferred, the case would have warranted appellate interference. Since the transfers had occurred by the time of the appeal, however, an injunction against the original respondent could no longer provide effective relief; the appropriate course was to bring the subsequent purchasers on record and ensure an early adjudication of the title suit.

The appeal was accordingly disposed of with directions that: (i) respondent nos. 2 to 4 would retain their right to assert their claims when necessary; (ii) the appellant would implead the subsequent purchasers within two weeks; and (iii) upon their impleadment, the trial court would proceed in accordance with law without unnecessary adjournments. The trial court was directed to conclude Title Suit No. 56 of 2022 within nine months and, if unable to do so, submit a detailed report explaining the delay.