Removal from service for 20 months’ unauthorised absence is not shockingly disproportionate.

The petitioner, a Peon in the Tamil Nadu Circle Postal Co-operative Bank, remained absent from duty after expiry of his medical leave on 2 February 2004.

The Bank issued show-cause notices dated 1 September 2004 and 25 February 2005, both of which were returned with postal endorsements indicating that the petitioner was unavailable.

The Disciplinary Action Sub-Committee thereafter resolved to remove him from service, and the President communicated the removal order dated 11 November 2005, with effect from 29 October 2005.

The petitioner contended that the order was issued by an incompetent authority under By-Law No.65(13) and that his absence was attributable to medical reasons.

His challenge and subsequent representation/review were rejected, including by the impugned order dated 4 June 2022.

Whether the order of removal was invalid because it was communicated and signed by the President, allegedly an authority incompetent under By-Law No.65(13) to impose dismissal or removal from service.

Whether the punishment of removal from service for approximately 20 months of unauthorised absence was disproportionate, particularly in view of the petitioner’s asserted medical condition.

Whether the High Court, in exercise of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution, could reappreciate the disciplinary findings or substitute a different punishment.

By-Law No.65(13) of the Bank was considered as conferring the authority to impose dismissal or removal from service on the Board of Directors or an appropriately constituted Sub-Committee.

The Court applied the settled limits of judicial review in disciplinary matters, relying on B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749, Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) v. Ajai Kumar Srivastava, (2021) 2 SCC 61, and Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Ajit Kumar Singh, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 478.

These authorities establish that judicial review is not an appellate reappraisal of evidence; the Court intervenes only for procedural unfairness, violation of natural justice, perversity, absence of evidence, or punishment that is shockingly disproportionate.

Where there is some evidence supporting the disciplinary conclusion, and the penalty is not disproportionate to the misconduct, the disciplinary decision must ordinarily be sustained.

The Court rejected the petitioner’s challenge to the competence of the authority because the removal decision was taken by the Disciplinary Action Sub-Committee pursuant to the relevant Board resolution; the President merely communicated that decision as the Bank’s human agency.

The wording of the order itself stated that the petitioner was removed “in pursuance of the Board resolution,” and the mere fact that the President signed or issued the communication did not establish that he had independently imposed the punishment.

The Court further found that the petitioner had remained absent for about 20 months after expiry of his leave and that the Bank had issued repeated notices before taking disciplinary action.

Applying the restricted scope of judicial review, the Court held that it could not reassess the petitioner’s explanation or substitute its own view unless the findings were unsupported by evidence or the penalty was shockingly disproportionate.

The Board had considered the relevant circumstances, including the petitioner’s conduct and delay in challenging the removal, and removal from service for prolonged unauthorised absence was not disproportionate.

It further held that removal from service for approximately 20 months of unauthorised absence was proportionate and did not warrant interference under Article 226.

The writ petition was accordingly dismissed, with no order as to costs, and no reinstatement, back wages, continuity of service, or other monetary relief was granted.