Interim-order challenges may be pursued through a vacation application before the Single Judge.

The Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (“Respondent”) had instituted W.P.(C) 3248/2025 challenging the cancellation of its Certificate of Registration under the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010, by order dated 12 September 2024.

Pending the writ petition, the learned Single Judge, by order dated 19 May 2026, directed the Union of India (“Appellant”) to release ₹20,00,000 from the Respondent’s reserve fund for recurring operational expenses, subject to authentication by a Chartered Accountant and submission of a certificate to the Court.

The Appellant contended that the interim application had been disposed of without formal notice or an opportunity to file a written objection, although oral submissions had been heard.

The Respondent pointed out that the Appellant had subsequently filed an application for recall, which was withdrawn with liberty to seek appropriate relief, including vacation of the interim order.

The delay of 61 days in filing the appeal was condoned under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Whether the intra-court appeal against the interim order directing release of ₹20,00,000 was required to be adjudicated on merits, particularly when the Appellant had an available remedy of seeking vacation of the interim order before the learned Single Judge?

Whether the Appellant should be granted liberty to file an appropriate application seeking vacation of the interim order and to place its objections before the learned Single Judge?

The Court applied the procedural power under Section 151 CPC, read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, to condone the 61-day delay in filing the appeal.

It proceeded on the principle that an interim order may ordinarily be challenged or sought to be vacated before the court that passed it, particularly where the proceedings remain pending and the affected party has an opportunity to place its objections before that court.

The Court did not decide the merits of the challenge to the interim order, the validity of the FCRA cancellation, or the maintainability of the writ petition.

The Division Bench noted that the impugned order was interlocutory and that the Appellant could seek its vacation before the learned Single Judge in the pending writ proceedings.

Since the Appellant had already withdrawn its recall application with liberty to pursue appropriate relief, the Bench considered it unnecessary to examine the merits of the submissions in the appeal at that stage.

It therefore preserved the Appellant’s right to file a substantive application seeking vacation of the interim order, while directing that the Respondent be permitted to file a reply and that the application be considered expeditiously alongside the writ petition.

The Court expressly clarified that its observations would not prejudice either party on the merits and that all issues, including maintainability, remained open.

The Appellant was granted liberty to move an appropriate application seeking vacation of the interim order before the learned Single Judge within one week; the Respondent was permitted to file its reply by the next date of listing.

The Division Bench requested the learned Single Judge to hear the application and the writ petition expeditiously, noting the scheduled listing on 30 September 2026.

All issues and grounds, including maintainability of the writ petition, were left open.

The pending application and the appeal were disposed of accordingly.