01Facts
The parties married on 11 May 1995 and have two sons. The wife left the matrimonial home with the children in 2013; the husband later obtained an ex parte decree for restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, on 11 November 2016.
¶ 1–4, 18–23, 48–60The parties had also participated in mediation and, according to the husband, briefly resumed living together. The wife alleged that she returned to her parental home after further ill-treatment.
¶ 1–4, 18–23, 48–60In 2019, the husband petitioned for divorce, relying on the wife’s non-compliance with the restitution decree and alleging desertion. The Family Court dismissed the petition, finding that he had not proved his case on a balance of probabilities. He appealed under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984.
¶ 1–4, 18–23, 48–6002Issues
i.1. Whether the Family Court’s dismissal of the divorce petition was perverse or otherwise warranted interference in appeal
¶ 5–8, 27–33, 46ii.2. Whether the husband established entitlement to divorce under Section 13(1-A)(ii) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, on the basis of non-resumption of cohabitation after the restitution decree, or proved desertion by the wife
¶ 15, 42–45, 60–6203Law Applied
Section 13(1-A)(ii) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 permits either spouse to seek divorce where conjugal rights have not been restituted for at least one year after a decree for restitution of conjugal rights.
¶ 43–45In civil proceedings, facts are proved on a preponderance of probabilities, not beyond reasonable doubt; the Court referred to Section 3 of the Evidence Act and A. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur.
¶ 38–40Under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, an appeal lies to the High Court on facts and law, and the first appellate court may reappraise the evidence.
¶ 34–37A factual finding is perverse where it ignores or excludes relevant evidence, relies on irrelevant material, or is so irrational that no reasonable court could have reached it; a different view of the evidence or its alleged inadequacy alone is insufficient. The Court relied on Arulvelu v. State and Damodar Lal v. Sohan Devi for this standard.
¶ 30–33Desertion requires proof of separation and an intention permanently to end matrimonial cohabitation, or animus deserendi.
¶ 62Provisions in the judgment · 8 · Linked ones open on LawLens
Family Courts Act, 1984 Section 7Section 19
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 Section 9Section 13
Indian Penal Code, 1860 Section 323Section 506
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 Section 125
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 Section 96
04Reasoning
The High Court found no basis to disturb the Family Court’s assessment.
¶ 53–57Although the Section 9 decree had been passed in 2016, the husband did not show that the wife knew of it or that he had taken steps to enforce it with a genuine intention of restoring cohabitation; the decree also did not disclose the parties’ mediation settlement or subsequent period of living together.
¶ 53–57The wife stated that she wished to live with her husband, while alleging that she had returned to her parental home after being mistreated. In those circumstances, the evidence did not establish that her separation reflected a settled intention to end the marriage.
¶ 58–63The husband therefore failed to prove either knowing, wilful non-compliance with the decree as advanced in support of his claim or the essential element of animus deserendi; the Family Court’s conclusion was not perverse.
¶ 58–6305Holding
The High Court held that the husband had not established grounds for reversing the Family Court’s decision.
¶ 63–65The appeal was dismissed, and any pending interlocutory applications were disposed of.
¶ 63–65Original Court PDF
MITHILESH KUMARvsRITA DEVI
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