Jharkhand HC Sets Aside 2018 PC Act Charge, Keeps 1992 Exam-Bribery Case Against 3 Retired Examiners Alive

The petitioners, three senior citizens who had served as examiners at Government Polytechnic, Adityapur, sought to quash the criminal proceedings arising from an alleged demand or receipt of illegal gratification for evaluating examination answer sheets on 6 June 1992.

The FIR, lodged on 7 June 1992, invoked Section 161 read with Section 34 IPC and Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act; the charge-sheet and cognizance order of 27 September 2023 used the same provisions.

On 4 December 2024, the trial court framed a charge under Section 7(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act as amended in 2018.

The petitioners challenged the cognizance order, the charge, and the continuation of the case after more than three decades. They also argued that no valid sanction had been produced.

The High Court examined the sanction document and found that the certified copy on record was a letter issued by the Secretary, Science and Technology Department, granting sanction for prosecution of the accused.

The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 had replaced the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and repealed Section 161 IPC; the applicable substantive law is the law in force when the alleged offence occurred, and the 2018 amendments do not govern alleged conduct from 1992.

An error in citing the applicable statutory provisions does not, by itself, invalidate cognizance where the court had jurisdiction and no prejudice to the accused is shown.

On delay, P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578, holds that there is no fixed limitation period requiring automatic termination of a criminal trial; the court must assess whether delay has made the proceedings oppressive or unwarranted, with Article 21 and the circumstances of the case in view.

The Court also considered State of Punjab v. Labh Singh, (2014) 16 SCC 807, on sanction where a public servant has superannuated before cognizance.

The Court found that the FIR and cognizance order mistakenly referred to repealed provisions, but the allegations concerned illegal gratification and were not outside the scope of the 1988 Act. Given the trial court’s jurisdiction and the absence of demonstrated prejudice, the incorrect statutory references did not warrant setting aside cognizance.

The sanction objection also failed: the record contained a certified copy of the Secretary’s letter granting sanction, and the trial court’s earlier failure to recognise its nature had caused the delay in obtaining it.

However, Section 7(a) as amended in 2018 could not apply to alleged conduct in 1992, so the charge framed under that provision could not stand.

The Court declined to quash the case for delay, noting that the charge-sheet had been filed in 2000, the delay in cognizance stemmed in part from the trial court’s error concerning the sanction letter, the petitioners had remained on bail, and the allegations were serious; it found no sufficient basis to conclude that the delay had caused prejudice requiring termination of the proceedings.

The petitioners were directed to appear before the trial court on 1 December 2026, and the parties were directed to cooperate so the old case could be concluded promptly.