Jharkhand High Court upholds Delhi as arbitration seat after State’s prolonged silence and participation in proceedings

The Road Construction Department, Government of Jharkhand, entered into an agreement with Ramky Infrastructure Limited on 22 September 2010 for rehabilitation and upgradation of the Barhet-Sahebganj section of the Govindpur-Sahebganj Jharkhand State Road Project.

Clause 20.6(b)(iii) of the agreement provided that the arbitration proceedings would be held at the Conference Building, Mantralaya, Ranchi, Jharkhand, with English as the language of arbitration.

In Procedural Order No. 1 dated 22 September 2023, passed in the presence of the parties’ representatives, the tribunal fixed Delhi as the seat of arbitration and stated that the venue would be decided with the parties from time to time.

The State did not immediately challenge this determination and continued participating in the arbitration for more than two and a half years.

Ramky Infrastructure thereafter filed a petition under Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before the Delhi High Court for extension of the tribunal’s mandate.

The Delhi High Court nevertheless extended the tribunal’s mandate, observing that Delhi was, at that stage, the seat of arbitration.

The State subsequently filed an application under Section 16 of the Arbitration Act challenging the tribunal’s determination of Delhi as the seat.

The tribunal rejected the application through Procedural Order No. 30 dated 8 May 2026. The State challenged that order under Article 226 of the Constitution before the Jharkhand High Court.

Whether the arbitral tribunal could fix Delhi as the seat of arbitration when the agreement specified Ranchi as the venue of arbitration but did not expressly designate the seat.

Whether the State had waived or acquiesced in its objection to Delhi being treated as the seat by participating in the arbitration without timely objection.

Whether the High Court should interfere under Article 226 with the arbitral tribunal’s order rejecting the State’s jurisdictional objection under Section 16 of the Arbitration Act.

The Court applied Section 20 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, under which parties may agree on the place of arbitration; failing such agreement, the tribunal may determine it having regard to the circumstances and convenience of the parties, while hearings or meetings may be held elsewhere under Section 20(3).

It relied on Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552, and Bharat Broadband Network Ltd. v. United Telecoms Ltd.—as cited in the judgment through the distinction discussed in BALCO—and BBR (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. S.P. Singla Constructions Pvt. Ltd., (2023) 1 SCC 693, for the principle that the seat is the juridical home of the arbitration, determines the supervisory court and procedural law, remains static once fixed, and is distinct from the movable venue.

Section 4 of the Arbitration Act was applied to hold that a party aware of non-compliance with an arbitrational requirement, but proceeding without timely objection, is deemed to have waived its right to object.

The Court relied on Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v. Motorola India Pvt. Ltd., (2009) 2 SCC 337, on waiver by failure to object without undue delay.

The Court relied on Tarini Prasad Mohanty v. Sunflag Iron & Steel Co. Ltd., 2026 SCC OnLine SC 973, for the proposition that writ jurisdiction should not be used to examine the merits of an order passed under Section 16.

The Court distinguished between the contractual venue at Ranchi and the juridical seat of arbitration.

Since the agreement did not expressly designate the seat or confer exclusive jurisdiction on any court, the tribunal was competent under Section 20 to determine the seat.

The tribunal fixed Delhi as the seat in its first procedural order in the presence of the parties, and the State continued participating in the proceedings without raising a timely challenge.

The State also appeared before the Delhi High Court in the Section 29A proceedings, accepted the extension of the tribunal’s mandate, and did not challenge that order despite the court’s observation that Delhi was the seat.

This conduct was held to constitute acquiescence and waiver under Section 4.

The Court further held that the challenge arose from an order under Section 16 and that the statutory remedy under Section 34 remained available; therefore, writ interference was unwarranted, particularly where the petition effectively sought adjudication of the merits of the tribunal’s jurisdictional determination.

In any event, the State had waived its objection by failing to challenge the tribunal’s determination without undue delay and by continuing with the arbitration.

The Court declined to interfere under Article 226 with Procedural Order No. 30 dated 8 May 2026, dismissed the writ petition, and disposed of any pending interlocutory applications.