Judicial review cannot reappraise evidence or substitute findings in a duly conducted disciplinary enquiry.

The petitioner, an erstwhile Manager (B & AC) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (“LIC”), was appointed on 31 March 1983 and dismissed from service with effect from 11 March 2016.

The disciplinary action arose from an alleged duplicate payment of ₹79,000 made through the petitioner’s system to LIC agent P.C. Adak on 29 October 2013, after an earlier payment had allegedly been made on 8 October 2013. The amount was refunded by the agent on 8 November 2013.

A charge-sheet was issued on 10 February 2015, followed by a departmental enquiry in which the petitioner submitted his defence, responded to the presenting officer’s brief and enquiry report, and received a second show-cause notice.

He was dismissed on 11 March 2016; his statutory appeal was dismissed on 7 June 2016.

Since the petitioner superannuated on 31 August 2019, reinstatement became academic and the principal surviving claim concerned arrear salary and consequential benefits.

By CAN 2 of 2025, he separately sought payment of gratuity under Rule 77(5) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Rules, 1960.

1. Whether the departmental enquiry and the consequential dismissal order were vitiated by breach of natural justice, denial of reasonable opportunity, non-consideration of material documents, or procedural irregularity.

2. Whether the findings of misconduct were perverse or unsupported by evidence so as to warrant interference under Article 226 of the Constitution.

3. Whether recovery of the allegedly overpaid amount under Rule 39(1)(c) of the Staff Rules precluded the imposition of the major penalty of dismissal or rendered the punishment impermissibly disproportionate.

4. Whether the petitioner was entitled to gratuity under Rule 77(5) notwithstanding his dismissal from service.

Rule 39(1)(c) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Rules, 1960, permits recovery of the whole or part of pecuniary loss caused to the Corporation by negligence or breach of orders as a minor penalty.

Judicial review under Article 226 in disciplinary matters is supervisory, not appellate, and is directed to the legality and fairness of the decision-making process rather than reappreciation of evidence.

Relying on B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749, Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610, Pravin Kumar v. Union of India, (2020) 9 SCC 471, DGM v. Ajai Kumar Srivastava, (2021) 2 SCC 612, Ex-Constable/Mukesh Kumar Raigar v. Union of India, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 27, and M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India, (2006) 5 SCC 88, the Court reiterated that interference is justified only for jurisdictional error, breach of natural justice or statutory procedure, reliance on no evidence or irrelevant material, perversity, or a conclusion that no reasonable authority could have reached.

Departmental findings are assessed on the basis of available material and the preponderance-of-probabilities standard, rather than the strict rules of criminal evidence.

The Court found that the petitioner had received the charge-sheet, participated in the enquiry, presented his defence, responded to the presenting officer’s brief and enquiry report, and was given a further opportunity through the second show-cause notice; he also availed himself of the statutory appeal.

Therefore, rejection of his defence did not amount to denial of natural justice.

His complaint regarding the voucher and related documents was raised belatedly, after conclusion of the disciplinary and appellate proceedings, rather than as a contemporaneous objection during the enquiry or before the disciplinary authority.

The Court held that such a subsequent attempt to reopen the enquiry was impermissible and appeared to be an afterthought.

The enquiry officer’s conclusions were based on material indicating that the earlier payment and the subsequent manual or “green voucher” payment were irregular, and the petitioner’s challenge essentially sought a different appreciation of evidence.

Since the Court found no finding based on no evidence, no legally demonstrable perversity, and no procedural prejudice, it declined to reassess the evidence or substitute its own view.

The petitioner’s reliance on recovery of the amount under Rule 39(1)(c) did not establish a legal bar to dismissal in the absence of a jurisdictional or procedural infirmity.

It held that the departmental enquiry and dismissal were not vitiated by breach of natural justice, denial of reasonable opportunity, perversity, arbitrariness, or material procedural irregularity.

The challenge to the dismissal order dated 11 March 2016 and the subsequent rejection of the petitioner’s representation failed.

WPA 7372 of 2018 was dismissed, and CAN 2 of 2025 seeking gratuity was also dismissed.

No reinstatement, arrear salary, consequential benefits, or gratuity was granted.