Judicial review cannot reappreciate departmental evidence absent perversity, procedural illegality, or natural justice violation.

The petitioner, a police employee deployed to guard a prisoner admitted in a hospital, was charged departmentally with negligence and unauthorised absence after the prisoner committed suicide in the hospital toilet at approximately midnight.

The petitioner stated that his duty was initially from 12:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m.; he later admitted that he had left for the Police Lines to have dinner because food was unavailable at the hospital and returned at about 12:30 a.m., after learning of the incident.

Following a departmental inquiry in which the petitioner cross-examined the witnesses, the charges were found proved and one increment was withheld with cumulative effect by order dated 25 August 2014.

His appeal and mercy appeal were rejected.

The petitioner relied on a separate judicial inquiry, which reportedly concluded that the prisoner’s suicide was attributable to no one and resulted from personal problems.

He therefore challenged the punishment, appellate order, and mercy-order before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.

1. Whether the departmental authorities were justified in finding the petitioner guilty of negligence and unauthorised absence and imposing the punishment of withholding one increment with cumulative effect.

2. Whether the High Court, exercising judicial review under Article 226, could reappreciate the evidence or interfere with the disciplinary orders on the basis of the separate judicial inquiry.

3. Whether the punishment imposed was disproportionate, perverse, without jurisdiction, or otherwise liable to interference.

The Court applied the limited scope of judicial review under Article 226 in disciplinary matters, holding that the High Court does not act as an appellate authority and cannot reappreciate evidence unless there is an error of law, procedural illegality, violation of natural justice, perversity, or manifest miscarriage of justice.

Relying on Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Mohd. Nasrullah Khan, (2006) 2 SCC 373, the Court reiterated that judicial review is not equivalent to adjudication on merits by reassessing departmental evidence.

The Court further applied the principle that disciplinary punishment may be interfered with only where it is wholly unjustified, disproportionate, perverse, or imposed without jurisdiction.

The departmental inquiry complied with procedural requirements: the petitioner was given an opportunity of hearing and cross-examined the departmental witnesses.

His own statement established that he was absent from the hospital when the prisoner committed suicide and that he had left his place of duty to obtain dinner.

This constituted a sufficient evidentiary basis for the findings of unauthorised absence and negligence.

The Court declined to reassess the departmental evidence or accept the petitioner’s alternative interpretation of his duty hours, consistent with the restricted scope of Article 226 review.

It also held that the judicial inquiry served a different purpose—ascertaining the circumstances and possible cause of the suicide—and did not determine whether the petitioner had committed departmental misconduct by negligence or absence from duty.

Since the petitioner failed to establish perversity, procedural unfairness, lack of jurisdiction, or disproportionality, the disciplinary orders did not warrant interference.

The separate judicial inquiry did not exonerate him from the distinct disciplinary charges.

Finding no perversity or legal infirmity in the punishment, appellate order, or mercy-order, the Court dismissed the writ petition and declined to grant any relief.