01Facts
The Society and the developer entered into an MOU under which the developer was to procure land for the Society.
¶ 4–5, 17–18After the developer failed to do so, the MOU was cancelled and the developer agreed to repay ₹1,21,10,000, for which he issued a cheque.
¶ 4–5, 17–18After the cheque’s first dishonour, he paid ₹20,00,000 in two instalments.
¶ 4–5, 17–18The Society then presented the cheque again for its full face value; it was dishonoured, and the Society brought a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (“NI Act”).
¶ 4–5, 17–18The trial court convicted the accused and imposed a fine of ₹1,35,00,000; the appellate court upheld the conviction but reduced the amount to ₹1,05,00,000, taking account of the ₹20,00,000 already paid.
¶ 7The accused challenged the conviction and sentence, while the Society challenged the appellate court’s reduction.
¶ 1–202Issues
i.Whether, after the accused made a part-payment before the cheque’s second presentation, presentation of the cheque for its full face value—without recording the part-payment—could sustain an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act.
¶ 19–23ii.Whether the courts below committed a material error warranting interference in revision by failing to consider the effect of the admitted part-payment.
¶ 10–13, 2503Law Applied
Section 138 of the NI Act requires, among other things, that the cheque be issued towards a legally enforceable debt or liability and that the statutory conditions for dishonour and notice be met.
¶ 14Sections 118 and 139 provide rebuttable presumptions concerning consideration and the existence of a legally enforceable debt.
¶ 15Under Sections 15 and 56, when part-payment is made after a cheque is drawn but before it is encashed, the part-payment must be endorsed on the instrument; the cheque may then be presented for the balance, and an unendorsed cheque presented for its original amount does not represent the enforceable debt then due.
¶ 20–21, citing Dashrathbhai Trikambhai Patel v. Hitesh Mahendrabhai Patel, (2023) 1 SCC 578Revisional jurisdiction is supervisory, not a second appeal, and interference is justified where, for example, a material matter was not considered or the decision is perverse or untenable.
¶ 12–13Provisions in the judgment · 10 · Linked ones open on LawLens
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 Section 397Section 401Section 313Section 200
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 Section 138Section 56Section 139Section 118Section 15Section 148
04Reasoning
The accused’s ₹20,00,000 payment after the first presentation and before the second was admitted.
¶ 18Although the complaint described the payments as interest, the complainant did not establish that characterization by evidence; its witness stated there was no agreement for interest, and no supporting document was produced.
¶ 18The Court therefore treated the payments as part-payment of the cheque debt.
¶ 18Because the Society presented the cheque for the full ₹1,21,10,000 without endorsing the payments or presenting it for the remaining balance, the cheque did not represent the legally enforceable amount due at the time of the second presentation.
¶ 21–25The courts below had not considered this material issue, warranting revisional interference.
¶ 21–2505Holding
The High Court allowed the accused’s Criminal Revision Petition No. 49/2024 and dismissed the Society’s Criminal Revision Petition No. 183/2024.
¶ 26(i)–(ii)It set aside the conviction and the appellate sentence, cancelled the accused’s bail bond, and directed that amounts deposited by the accused and withdrawn by the Society be refunded under Section 148(3) of the NI Act within 60 days of receipt of the certified judgment.
¶ 26(iii)–(vi)The Society remained at liberty to pursue recovery of any balance by appropriate legal proceedings.
¶ 25Original Court PDF
GARUDADHRI DEVELOPERSvsSREE AKSHAYA HOUSING CO OPERATIVE SOCIETY LTD
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