Last-seen evidence cannot sustain conviction where the circumstantial chain leaves reasonable doubt.

The appellants were convicted by the Sessions Judge, Pauri Garhwal, of offences under Sections 302/34, 120-B/34 and 201/34 IPC for the murder of Umanand, and sentenced to imprisonment, including life imprisonment for murder.

The prosecution case relied principally on evidence that the deceased had been seen with the accused before his body was found on 29 March 2012. No witness testified to seeing the killing.

A witness whose statement had been recorded under Section 164 CrPC did not support that account at trial, and several witnesses were declared hostile.

The appellants appealed against their convictions, contending that the circumstantial evidence was incomplete and the recovery evidence unreliable.

The Court applied the principles governing conviction on circumstantial evidence in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, 1984 AIR 1622: the circumstances must be fully established, consistent only with guilt, conclusive, exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, and form a complete chain.

The last-seen circumstance is a link in the chain and cannot, by itself, ordinarily form the sole basis for conviction; the interval between the deceased being last seen and death must also be considered.

A statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC is not substantive evidence and may be used to corroborate or contradict its maker during trial.

The charges before the Court were under Sections 302, 120-B and 201 IPC, read with Section 34 IPC as applicable.

The Court found that no witness had seen the appellants kill Umanand or leave the scene, and that the last-seen evidence did not establish a sufficiently close or exclusive connection to the death; the post-mortem estimate and the interval before recovery left open the possibility of another person’s involvement.

The Section 164 statement could not fill that evidentiary gap because its maker did not support it at trial.

The Court also identified deficiencies concerning the delayed FIR, the uncertain basis for the recovery, the inconclusive FSL results, conflicting evidence about the recovery location, the hostile witnesses, and the absence of proved motive.

Taken together, the circumstances did not exclude reasonable hypotheses consistent with innocence or complete the chain required by Sharad Birdhichand Sarda.

It set aside the judgment and sentences dated 31 March 2014 and acquitted the appellants of the charges under Sections 302/34, 120-B/34 and 201 IPC; as they were on bail, they were not required to surrender and their bail bonds were discharged.