Material inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony and DNA findings created reasonable doubt, requiring acquittal.

The prosecution alleged that appellant no. 1 repeatedly sexually assaulted the 14-year-old victim in 2018, causing her pregnancy, and that both appellants threatened her.

The trial court convicted appellant no. 1 under Sections 506 and 120B IPC and Sections 5(j)(ii)/6 of the POCSO Act; it convicted appellant no. 2 under Sections 506 and 120B IPC and Section 17 of the Act.

On appeal, the appellants challenged the reliability of the victim’s testimony, relying on inconsistencies about the number and circumstances of the alleged incidents and DNA reports that did not identify appellant no. 1 as the child’s biological father.

1. Whether the victim’s testimony was sufficiently reliable to sustain the appellants’ convictions, including without independent corroboration.

2. Whether, considering the contradictions in the evidence and the DNA reports, the prosecution proved the charges beyond reasonable doubt.

Under Section 118 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, a prosecutrix is a competent witness, and her testimony may alone support a conviction if the court finds it trustworthy; corroboration is not a rule of law, though it may be sought where the testimony does not inspire confidence (*State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain*, as quoted at para. 23).

The court also referred to the “sterling witness” standard in *Rai Sandeep @ Deepu v. State of NCT of Delhi*: a witness’s account must be consistent and sufficiently reliable to be accepted without hesitation.

The prosecution nevertheless bears the burden of proving the charges beyond reasonable doubt.

The charged offences were under Sections 506 and 120B IPC and Sections 5(j)(ii)/6 and 17 of the POCSO Act.

The Court found material inconsistencies in the victim’s accounts: the number and timing of the alleged assaults varied between the FIR, her medical history, her Section 164 CrPC statement and her testimony at trial.

Her accounts also differed regarding why she went to the appellants’ house and who was present during the first alleged incident; other details, including the alleged use of a handkerchief and a knife, had not been disclosed to the investigating officer.

The father’s evidence did not resolve these inconsistencies, the mother was not fully cross-examined and her testimony was excluded from consideration, and the DNA reports did not connect appellant no. 1 to the child.

In the Court’s view, the victim’s testimony was not sufficiently reliable to sustain conviction, and the remaining evidence did not prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt.

Appellant no. 2 was not required to surrender; appellant no. 1 was ordered released forthwith unless wanted in another case. Both appellants were directed to furnish bonds under Section 437-A CrPC.