‘Lost file cannot lose rights’: Kerala High Court presumes land-use permission granted after authorities failed to produce order

The petitioners were co-owners and possessors of properties in Kottuvally Village, Paravur Taluk, which continued to be classified as “Nilam” in the Basic Tax Register, although the lands were not included in the Data Bank under the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act, 2008 and had allegedly been reclaimed before the Act came into force.

Their predecessor-in-interest had submitted applications under Clause 6 of the Kerala Land Utilisation Order, 1967 (“KLU Order”) on 1 November 2014.

In an earlier judgment in W.P.(C) No. 32936 of 2014, the High Court directed the competent authority to consider the applications and indicated that permission could be granted for non-agricultural use after obtaining a report from the Agricultural Officer.

The Agricultural Officer and Village Officer subsequently submitted reports stating that the lands were reclaimed before 2008, were not included in the Data Bank, and were unsuitable for paddy cultivation.

The petitioners later submitted Form-A applications seeking reassessment/correction of the land classification. The Tahasildar rejected or declined to process the applications on the ground that the petitioners had not obtained an order permitting conversion under the KLU Order.

During the writ proceedings, the Revenue Divisional Officer contended that the original files were missing, although the dispatch register indicated that orders had been issued and dispatched pursuant to the earlier judgment. The authorities could not state whether those orders had allowed or rejected the KLU applications.

Whether the respondents could rely on the loss of the original administrative file to avoid giving effect to the binding directions issued in the earlier judgment under Clause 6 of the KLU Order.

Whether, in light of the earlier judgment and the reports of the Agricultural Officer and Village Officer, the KLU applications should be presumed to have been allowed.

Whether the petitioners, as successors-in-interest, were entitled to pursue the KLU applications originally filed by their predecessor-in-interest.

Whether the Tahasildar was required to reconsider the petitioners’ Form-A applications in accordance with the law declared in Tahasildar v. Renjith George.

The Court applied Clause 6 of the Kerala Land Utilisation Order, 1967, under which the competent authority may grant permission to utilise agricultural land for other purposes; the Collector under the KLU Order includes the Revenue Divisional Officer.

Praveen K. v. Land Revenue Commissioner, holding that a KLU application cannot be rejected without an enquiry into whether the land is paddy land or wetland and that, if it is not so found, the application must be considered under the KLU Order.

Sunil v. Killimangalam Panjal 5th Ward, recognising that Clause 6 permission may be granted for construction and other purposes; and Joseph John v. Land Revenue Commissioner, holding that prior reclamation or conversion does not bar consideration of a Clause 6 application.

Tahsildar v. Renjith George, which held that applications filed before 30 December 2017 and remaining pending are governed by the unamended statutory regime.

Constitutional courts may mould relief to do complete justice, as recognised in Adani Power Ltd. v. Union of India, and the State must act as a fair and model litigant rather than benefit from its administrative failures.

A successor-in-interest may continue proceedings initiated by the predecessor, as held in Firoz V.A. v. State of Kerala.

Delay and laches are flexible principles dependent on the facts and circumstances, relying on Shankara Co-op. Housing Society Ltd. v. M. Prabhakar and Mizo Chief Council Mizoram v. Union of India.

The earlier judgment did not merely require a fresh administrative consideration; it expressly stated that permission could be granted for non-agricultural use after obtaining the Agricultural Officer’s report.

The subsequent Agricultural Officer’s report supported the petitioners’ case by recording that the property had the character of a residential plot, was not in the Data Bank, and contained no paddy fields, wetlands, or watercourses.

The Village Officer’s report similarly stated that the land had been reclaimed before 2008 and was unsuitable for paddy cultivation.

In these circumstances, the Court held that an order rejecting the KLU applications would have been inconsistent with the earlier binding judgment and could potentially amount to contempt.

The State could not derive an advantage from its inability to preserve or trace the file, particularly when its own records showed that an order had been issued and dispatched.

The Court therefore presumed that the consequential order had allowed the applications.

It also rejected the objections based on delay and non-joinder of the predecessor-in-interest, holding that the State could not rely on its own administrative lapse and that the petitioners, as successors-in-interest, had the right to continue the proceedings.

The Court declared that, in light of the earlier judgment and the Agricultural Officer’s and Village Officer’s reports, the applications filed under Clause 6 of the KLU Order were to be presumed to have been allowed.

The communications issued by the Tahasildar requiring the petitioners to obtain a fresh conversion order were set aside.

The Tahasildar was directed to reconsider the petitioners’ Form-A applications in accordance with Tahasildar v. Renjith George and to take a decision within thirty days from receipt of the judgment.