01Facts
The accused, an Ustad at a madrassa, was alleged to have repeatedly sexually assaulted a 17-year-old student by touching her breast.
¶ 6–7A crime was registered under Section 354A(1)(i) IPC and Sections 7, 8, 9(l), 9(f) and 10 of the POCSO Act
¶ 6–7After attaining majority, the victim filed an affidavit stating that she had no grievance against the accused and did not object to the proceedings being quashed.
¶ 8On noticing conflicting Single Judge decisions concerning quashing POCSO proceedings on settlement, a learned Single Judge referred the issue to a Division Bench.
¶ 2–3, 902Issues
i.Whether criminal proceedings involving POCSO offences may be quashed solely because the victim, after attaining majority, or her family has entered into a settlement with the accused, including where the alleged offence is of comparatively lesser gravity
¶ 15 · ¶ 35ii.Whether the High Court retains inherent jurisdiction to quash POCSO proceedings on grounds independent of settlement, such as where the allegations do not disclose an offence or the proceedings amount to an abuse of process
¶ 3903Law Applied
The Court considered Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and its corresponding provision, Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, which preserve the High Court’s inherent power to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of process; that power is distinct from compounding under Section 320 CrPC, but does not permit quashing merely because parties have settled.
¶ 18–19, 39Applying Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, Parbatbhai Aahir v. State of Gujarat and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan, the Court held that the nature and gravity of the offence and its societal impact weigh against settlement-based quashing of serious offences.
¶ 19–21It also relied on State of Madhya Pradesh v. Madanlal and Shimbhu v. State of Haryana for the principle that sexual offences cannot be treated as matters for private compromise
¶ 23, 25–26The protective purpose of the POCSO Act requires particular caution where the alleged victim was a child.
¶ 16–17, 27Provisions in the judgment · 16 · Linked ones open on LawLens
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 Section 5Section 6Section 7Section 8Section 9Section 10Section 15
Indian Penal Code, 1860 Section 342Section 376Section 504Section 509
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 Section 320Section 482
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 Section 528
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 Section 3
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 Section 64
04Reasoning
The Court reasoned that POCSO offences implicate the public interest in protecting children and cannot be converted into private disputes terminable at the victim’s or family’s will.
¶ 16–18The victim’s attaining majority does not alter the legal character of alleged conduct committed when she was a child; nor does the classification of an offence as comparatively less grave make it compoundable or privately settleable.
¶ 22, 35–36A settlement or affidavit may also reflect pressure, dependence or inducement, requiring the Court to assess the case independently.
¶ 33–34The exceptional circumstances in Ayyub Malik and Harmeet Singh—including an established marriage, cohabitation and a child—did not apply to the present facts.
¶ 28–31However, the Court clarified that settlement does not foreclose quashing where an independent examination shows that the offence’s ingredients are absent, the allegations are inherently improbable, or the proceedings are frivolous, vexatious or otherwise an abuse of process.
¶ 3905Holding
The Division Bench answered the reference by holding that POCSO proceedings cannot ordinarily be quashed solely on the basis of a settlement or compromise, even where the alleged offence is of comparatively lesser gravity.
¶ 40The inherent jurisdiction remains available in an appropriate case on independent merits, within the governing legal parameters.
¶ 39–40The reference was answered accordingly, and the matter was directed back to the learned Single Judge for consideration of the petition on its merits.
¶ 41 and concluding directionOriginal Court PDF
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