Malicious prosecution claims require cogent proof of malice, lack of probable cause, and resulting reputational injury.

The appellant, a Deputy Superintendent of Excise, alleged that the respondent, a police officer, had sexually and emotionally exploited her and subsequently lodged a false FIR against her and others in retaliation for her complaint to the Director General of Police. The respondent’s FIR dated 30 August 2011 led to Karimganj P.S. Case No. 483/2011 under Sections 120B, 384, 385, 389 and 353 of the IPC read with Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2008; a police search was also conducted at the appellant’s residence.

The appellant challenged the criminal proceedings before the High Court and Supreme Court. Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s directions, both cases were investigated by a common senior officer. Final reports were submitted in both matters; the final report in the respondent’s case was accepted by the competent criminal court.

The appellant thereafter instituted Title Suit No. 70/2015 claiming ₹5.25 crore as special and exemplary damages for malicious prosecution, injury to reputation, humiliation and mental trauma. The Civil Judge (Senior Division), Dibrugarh dismissed the suit on 29 February 2024. Although the appellant examined four witnesses and produced 17 documents, the respondent led no evidence.

The present first appeal was filed under Section 96 CPC.

The appeal was governed by Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which permits a first appeal against an original decree.

The Court applied the law of malicious prosecution, holding that the cause of action is founded on the wrongful and malicious setting of criminal law in motion; formal prosecution followed by acquittal is not invariably necessary if criminal proceedings were initiated, caused damage, and ultimately ended in the plaintiff’s favour.

However, the plaintiff must prove that the proceedings were instituted with malice, without reasonable or probable cause, and caused legally cognisable injury, including loss of reputation.

The Court also applied the principle that alleged defamation or reputational injury must be established by reliable evidence showing that the plaintiff’s reputation was lowered in the estimation of others.

The appellant relied on Roop Singh v. Amarjeet Singh, 2017 (4) ICC 516, for the proposition that formal prosecution and acquittal are not indispensable.

The Court accepted the appellant’s legal proposition that formal prosecution before a criminal court is not an absolute prerequisite for an action in malicious prosecution.

Nevertheless, the appellant failed to discharge the evidentiary burden. The materials indicated an intimate relationship followed by disputes, repeated attempts by the appellant to contact the respondent and to settle the matter through intermediaries, and complaints by both parties.

In that factual context, the Court held that the respondent’s FIR could not be characterised as having been lodged without reasonable or probable cause or solely with malicious intent.

The appellant’s own testimony regarding damage to her reputation was not corroborated by any independent witness from her workplace, society or community who had formed an adverse opinion about her because of the FIR or investigation.

The Court also found no evidence of excess or illegality in the search and seizure conducted during the investigation, nor independent evidence that the search lowered the appellant’s reputation.

Issue No. 3 sufficiently covered the alleged malicious prosecution, reputational injury and resulting trauma; therefore, the absence of a separate issue on defamation did not prejudice the appellant.

The unquantified claim of ₹5.25 crore, unsupported by any basis for computation in the plaint, further weakened the claim for damages.

The Trial Court’s findings were therefore upheld, and RFA No. 30/2024 was dismissed.

The parties were directed to bear their own costs, and the Trial Court record was ordered to be returned to the Trial Court.