Mandatory timelines for school fee regulation committees stayed due to operational unworkability and statutory inconsistency.

The Delhi School Education (Transparency in Fixation and Regulation of Fees) Act, 2025 ("Act") and its corresponding Rules came into force on 10.12.2025.

On 01.02.2026, the Respondents issued a "Removal of Difficulties" Notification ("Notification") to operationalize the fee fixation regime for the 2026-27 academic block.

The Notification bypassed statutory timelines, mandating the constitution of School Level Fee Regulation Committees (SLFRC) by 10.02.2026 and fee structure submissions by 24.02.2026.

This was challenged by various school associations on the grounds that the Notification was ultra vires the Act, as it used a "Removal of Difficulties" clause to override mandatory statutory provisions.

The court was moves to stay the Notification’s implementation pending final disposal of the main writ petitions.

Whether the Notification issued under Section 21 of the Act (Power to Remove Difficulties) is inconsistent with the parent Act by overriding statutory timelines and procedures.

Whether the implementation of the Notification should be stayed during the pendency of the writ petitions based on the principles of prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss.

The court applied Section 21 of the Act, which permits the executive to remove difficulties provided the action is "not inconsistent" with the Act.

It relied on the "Henry VIII Clause" doctrine from Madeva Upendra Sinai v. Union of India, which limits executive power to minor peripheral adjustments without touching the statute's substance.

It further cited Lachmi Narain v. Union of India and State of West Bengal v. Anindya Sundar Das, establishing that "removal of difficulty" cannot be used to change the scheme or essential provisions of an Act.

Additionally, the court examined Section 3 (prohibition of excess fee) and Section 5(7) (permitting collection of previous year's fee during disputes) of the Act to interpret the status of fee collection during transition periods.

The Court observed that the Notification's revised timelines are prima facie unworkable and inconsistent with the Act.

The Act requires a process—including potential unanimous agreement or appellate reference—that cannot realistically be concluded by the March 27 deadline set in the Notification.

Crucially, the Court found the Respondents' argument regarding an "urgent vacuum" under Section 3 (prohibiting unapproved fees) to be flawed; Section 5(7) of the Act expressly allows schools to collect the previous year's fee while a fee determination is pending.

Therefore, no "difficulty" existed that necessitated overriding the Act's timelines via executive order.

The Court also noted practical hurdles, such as the unavailability of audited financial statements for FY 2025-26 (required by Rule 9) and the ongoing Board Examinations hindering parent committee elections.

It held that the balance of convenience lies with the schools because any excess fee collected during the interim will be subject to the final outcome and can be refunded or adjusted, whereas compelling immediate compliance with unworkable timelines would cause administrative paralysis.

The Petitioners are permitted to collect the same fee as the previous academic year (2025-26) for the 2026-27 session, subject to final adjudication.

All applications were disposed of with the matter listed for final hearing on 12.03.2026.