Material contradictions in recovery evidence entitled the accused to acquittal under the Arms Act.

On 25 November 2004, SI Ajaib Singh claimed that, acting on information supplied by Sant Ram, a police party apprehended three persons near Mokhra culvert, Kalanaur, who allegedly attempted to rob Sant Ram.

Two of them, Ranbir alias Bansi and Kirori, were allegedly carrying loaded country-made pistols, while the third person, Parveen, allegedly possessed an iron rod.

The pistols and cartridges were seized, and the appellants were prosecuted under Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1959, besides Section 398 read with Section 34 IPC.

The trial court convicted the appellants under Section 25 of the Arms Act and sentenced each to two years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of ₹4,000, while acquitting Parveen; the appellants were also acquitted of the charge under Section 398 IPC.

The present appeal challenged the conviction and sentence.

The judgment records that proceedings qua appellant No. 2 stood abated by order dated 21 September 2026.

Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants were in conscious and unauthorised possession of the pistols and cartridges, thereby committing an offence under Section 25 of the Arms Act.

Whether the material contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and the failure of the principal eyewitness to support the prosecution case rendered the alleged recoveries doubtful.

Whether the trial court could rely on substantially the same evidence for convicting the appellants under Section 25 of the Arms Act after disbelieving that evidence for the charge under Section 398 IPC.

The Court applied Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1959, which penalises unauthorised possession of arms and requires the prosecution to establish the fact of possession and the absence of lawful authority.

The charge under Section 398 read with Section 34 IPC concerned an armed attempt to commit robbery.

The Court applied the fundamental criminal-law rule that the prosecution must prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that an accused is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt where the prosecution evidence is materially inconsistent or unreliable.

It also applied the principle that evidence rejected as unreliable on a material aspect cannot ordinarily be selectively relied upon to sustain another charge arising from the same factual narrative.

The Court found that Sant Ram, the prosecution’s principal independent witness, supported the occurrence generally but specifically denied that Parveen was present or that an iron rod had been recovered from him.

This substantially undermined the prosecution’s account that three persons had jointly attempted the robbery.

The Court further noted material contradictions among PW.6, PW.7 and PW.8 concerning the jeep’s lights, the time taken to complete the proceedings, the dispatch of the information memo, the availability of public witnesses, the presence of a witness named Sumer, and the return of the police seal.

The fact that the same evidence was disbelieved for the Section 398 IPC charge also weakened its use for proving the alleged firearm recoveries under Section 25 of the Arms Act.

Considering these circumstances cumulatively, the Court held that the prosecution’s version and the recoveries were surrounded by substantial suspicion and that the charge had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

The pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, were disposed of.

The order sheet additionally records that proceedings qua appellant No. 2 stood abated on 21 September 2026.