Material contradictions undermining eyewitness presence warrant benefit of doubt and acquittal.

On 11 November 1983, Neksey alias Vinod was allegedly attacked near Mohan Paan Wala’s shop in Gandhi Nagar, Firozabad.

The prosecution alleged that appellant Rama Kant restrained Neksey while co-accused Anil Kumar Pachauri @ Guddu stabbed him repeatedly. Neksey died while being taken to hospital.

The FIR was lodged by his brother Ram Nath at 9:35 p.m. on the same day.

The post-mortem disclosed three incised wounds and death from shock and haemorrhage caused by ante-mortem injuries.

The prosecution examined eight witnesses, including alleged eyewitnesses Ram Nath (PW-2) and Praveen Kumar (PW-3), the doctor, and police officials.

The accused denied the allegations under Section 313 CrPC, and the defence examined Mohan Lal (DW-1), who denied that the murder occurred outside his shop and stated that there was no electricity in the area during the relevant period.

The trial court convicted both accused under Sections 302 read with 34 IPC and sentenced them to life imprisonment.

During the appeal, Anil Kumar Pachauri died and the appeal against him abated; only Rama Kant remained before the Court.

Whether the FIR was ante-timed or otherwise unreliable despite being lodged approximately one hour after the alleged occurrence?

Whether the testimonies of PW-2 and PW-3 were reliable and sufficient to establish Rama Kant’s presence and participation in the assault?

Whether the prosecution proved Rama Kant’s guilt under Sections 302 read with 34 IPC beyond reasonable doubt, notwithstanding the contradictions in the eyewitness evidence and the defence testimony?

The Court applied Sections 302 and 34 IPC, concerning murder and joint liability for acts done in furtherance of common intention.

It reiterated that an eyewitness must establish his presence at the scene through reliable and confidence-inspiring evidence; where such presence is doubtful, the testimony becomes unsafe for reliance.

Relationship or closeness to the deceased does not by itself discredit an eyewitness, but such evidence must be carefully scrutinised and corroborated where necessary.

The Court also applied the principle that defence evidence must be assessed on the same standard as prosecution evidence and cannot be rejected merely because it supports the accused, relying on Munshi Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2002) 1 SCC 351, and Sanjiv Kumar v. State of Punjab, (2009) 16 SCC 487.

The prosecution was required to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt; reasonable doubt entitled the accused to acquittal.

The Court accepted that Neksey’s death was homicidal and medically consistent with sharp-edged weapon injuries, but held that the medical evidence did not identify the assailants.

The prosecution’s case against Rama Kant depended principally on PW-2 and PW-3.

Their presence was found doubtful because they gave inconsistent accounts about whether Mohan Lal’s paan shop was open, whether they were eating or merely ordering paan, and whether a rickshaw was present at the scene.

Their conduct was also considered unnatural: despite allegedly witnessing a brutal assault, they did not intervene, raise an immediate alarm, pursue the assailants, or—particularly in PW-3’s case—accompany the deceased to the hospital or police station.

The Court further found that DW-1’s evidence regarding the absence of electricity and the non-occurrence of the murder outside his shop materially undermined the eyewitnesses’ account that the scene was adequately illuminated.

Although the FIR was held to have been lodged promptly and was not treated as ante-timed, that finding did not cure the deficiencies in the ocular evidence.

The prior quarrel between the deceased and the accused, coupled with the witnesses’ relationship or closeness to the deceased, also made the possibility of false implication relevant.

Consequently, the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that Rama Kant had restrained the deceased or shared the common intention necessary for conviction under Sections 302/34 IPC.

The conviction and sentence dated 9 May 1989 against surviving appellant Rama Kant under Sections 302 read with 34 IPC were set aside, and he was acquitted by extending the benefit of doubt.

As he was already on bail, he was not required to surrender; his bail bonds were cancelled and the sureties discharged.