Material retraction in cross-examination bars selective reliance on a witness’s examination-in-chief.

The appellant, Gurmail Singh, was the son of deceased Baldev Singh and complainant Sukhdev Kaur. A dispute existed regarding payment of lease money and the transfer and cultivation of the deceased’s agricultural land.

On 4 May 2004, after a village gathering concerning the dispute, the prosecution alleged that Gurmail Singh followed Baldev Singh to the fields, pushed him, struck him with a danda, and repeatedly hit his body against a pucca watercourse, causing his death.

The FIR was registered against Gurmail Singh and his wife Jaspreet Kaur under Sections 302 and 120-B IPC. The trial court convicted Gurmail Singh under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to life imprisonment with a fine of ₹5,000, while acquitting Jaspreet Kaur.

The prosecution principally relied upon PW-2 Sukhdev Kaur, PW-3 Darshan Singh, and PW-6 Gurjant Singh as eyewitnesses, besides medical evidence and the alleged recovery of a bamboo danda pursuant to Gurmail Singh’s disclosure statement.

Whether the testimony of PW-2 and PW-3, which supported the prosecution in examination-in-chief but materially denied the prosecution version in cross-examination, could safely be relied upon to sustain the conviction?

Whether the medical evidence corroborated the alleged manner of assault, particularly the prosecution claim that the deceased suffered a fatal danda blow to the forehead?

Whether the alleged recovery of the bamboo danda pursuant to the appellant’s disclosure statement established its use in the commission of the offence?

Whether the prosecution proved the appellant’s guilt under Section 302 IPC beyond reasonable doubt?

The Court applied Section 302 IPC, governing the offence of murder.

The principle that a witness’s evidence must be assessed as a whole, including examination-in-chief, cross-examination, and re-examination; the prosecution cannot selectively rely on favourable portions while ignoring material denials or admissions in cross-examination.

A hostile or partly hostile witness’s testimony is not automatically effaced, but a portion may be relied upon only where it is otherwise truthful, consistent, and corroborated.

Under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, only that part of an accused’s disclosure statement which distinctly relates to the fact discovered is admissible; recovery of an article does not, by itself, prove that the article was used in the offence.

The Court relied on Mustkeem @ Sirajudeen v. State of Rajasthan, 2011 (3) RCR (Criminal) 766, for the requirement of a close evidentiary link between the recovered object and its use in the crime.

Medical evidence must be evaluated alongside the ocular account, particularly where the eyewitness version is materially uncertain.

The Court held that PW-2’s cross-examination denied her presence at the occurrence and attributed her naming of the appellant to police pressure, while PW-3 similarly denied witnessing the occurrence and stated that he did not know how the deceased died.

PW-6 did not support the prosecution even in examination-in-chief.

Accordingly, the Court found that the three alleged eyewitnesses did not furnish a consistent or reliable ocular account, and the favourable portions of their examination-in-chief could not be isolated from their material retractions in cross-examination.

The medical evidence did not positively corroborate the alleged danda blow: PW-3 referred to a blow on the left side of the forehead, whereas the doctor found the principal injury above the right eyebrow and accepted that it could have resulted from a face-down fall on a hard surface.

Finally, even assuming that the bamboo danda was recovered pursuant to the appellant’s disclosure, it was an ordinary article, unconnected by blood, tissue, DNA, hair, or other forensic evidence to the deceased or the injury. The recovery therefore did not establish that the weapon was used in the murder.

Viewed cumulatively, these deficiencies created a reasonable doubt regarding both the manner of death and the appellant’s participation.

The appeal was allowed; the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 27 October 2005 were set aside, and the appellant was acquitted by extending to him the benefit of reasonable doubt.

The Court directed that, if the appellant was in custody and was not required in any other case, he be released forthwith; his bail bonds, if any, stood discharged, and the case property was to be dealt with in accordance with law.