Medical evidence dating pregnancy before the alleged rape rendered the prosecution’s case untrustworthy, warranting acquittal.

The appellant challenged the judgment dated 22 April 2025 passed by the Special Judge, Udalguri, in Special (POCSO) Case No. 32/2022, whereby he was convicted under Section 376(3) IPC read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act and sentenced to life imprisonment with a fine of ₹20,000, in default, two months’ simple imprisonment, pursuant to Section 42 of the POCSO Act.

The prosecution case was that the victim, stated to be 16 years old, was raped by the appellant in a jungle on 11 April 2017 while she was returning after taking cattle from a paddy field; the appellant allegedly threatened her and made another unsuccessful attempt to rape her five days later.

The FIR was lodged on 17 October 2017. Upon medical examination on 18 October 2017, ultrasonography revealed a live foetus of 35 weeks and 2 days.

The prosecution alleged that the pregnancy resulted from the incident of 11 April 2017. A stillborn female child was subsequently examined by the doctor on 10 November 2017.

The appellant disputed paternity and sought DNA testing, but the test did not yield sufficient material for a conclusive finding.

Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant raped the victim on 11 April 2017, thereby committing offences under Section 376(3) IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act?

Whether the medical evidence regarding the gestational age of the foetus rendered the victim’s testimony—that the alleged rape caused her pregnancy—unreliable?

Whether the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial court were sustainable in the absence of conclusive DNA evidence linking the appellant to the child?

The Court applied Section 376(3) IPC, concerning aggravated punishment for rape of a girl below the prescribed age, and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, prescribing punishment for aggravated penetrative sexual assault.

Section 42 of the POCSO Act was applied to determine the applicable sentence where the conduct is punishable under both the IPC and the POCSO Act.

The Court proceeded on the fundamental criminal-law principle that the prosecution must establish the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that a conviction cannot be sustained where the principal testimony is contradicted by reliable medical evidence or where the prosecution case contains a material inconsistency going to the root of the charge.

No judicial precedent was cited or relied upon in the judgment.

The Court treated the gestational-age evidence as decisive. Since the foetus was assessed at 35 weeks and 2 days on 18 October 2017, the Court calculated that the pregnancy had commenced approximately in February 2017, nearly two months before the alleged rape on 11 April 2017.

The victim had specifically stated that she became pregnant as a result of the appellant’s alleged rape on 11 April 2017, and the prosecution did not allege any other act of rape by the appellant capable of causing the pregnancy.

Consequently, the medical evidence was found inconsistent with the victim’s account, materially undermining her credibility.

The evidence of her parents was also considered unreliable because their assertion that the pregnancy resulted from the alleged rape was contradicted by the medical evidence.

Although the appellant had sought DNA testing, the available blood samples were insufficient to establish paternity conclusively; therefore, the DNA issue did not cure the fundamental contradiction in the prosecution case.

The Court concluded that the prosecution had failed to prove that the appellant was the perpetrator of the charged offence.

The conviction under Section 376(3) IPC read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act and the sentence of life imprisonment were set aside.

The appellant was acquitted of all charges, and the respondents were directed to release him from judicial custody immediately unless he was required in another case.

The appeal was accordingly allowed, and the trial court record was directed to be returned.